The government is working hard to convince us that society has failed its youth. This is obviously different from the conservative claim that the young have failed society, but it is equally pernicious. The language circulating around the Milburn review has occasionally expanded beyond the emotional indulgence of "we have failed a generation" to encompass "system failure", but it turns out that the system in question is welfare. Even when the finger is pointed at politicians, as by Andy Burnham, they are merely a proxy for the electorate and thus wider society: "The fact that a million 16- to 24-year-olds are now not in education, employment or training (Neet) is not their fault. It is ours, as politicians." Another notable feature of the language is the emphasis placed on childhood, which returns us to the Jesuitical obsessions of New Labour and Sure Start. The efficacy and importance of early intervention for health and education is not in question. What is moot is whether children should be treated as factors of production from near-birth, something that suggests the annihilation of childhood rather than its protection.
The return to Blairite pieties has been welcomed by the usual suspects in the media. Thus Pippa Crerar happily cites the former Prime Minister's financialisation of society's shortcomings: "[Milburn's] approach has echoes of Tony Blair, who talked of “a hand up, not a hand out”, actively pursuing a policy of reforming and investing in welfare specifically to bring down what he termed the “bills of social failure”." Meanwhile, Polly Toynbee once more ethusiastically hails the dawn of a golden age: "This week marks a monumental turning point for young people in Britain: finally they will come first, not last. It will mark an end, we must hope, to a perverse system that casts down the future generation and overrewards the already privileged old." This conveniently ignores that workers over 60, still looking for a job as their state pension age recedes, are actually in a far worse position than the young, not least because the triple-lock will benefit the latter more over time. As a comfortably-off, upper middle-class OAP, this may not occur to Polly.
The emphasis on NEETs distracts attention from the fact that their problems do not magically disappear at 24. Insecure employment, poverty wages, high rents, insecure tenancies and the impossibility of saving for both a flat deposit and a pension are problems that affect all age-groups. And while it is certainly true that the disadvantages of inequality heavily affect children, those disadvantages are themselves the product of a socio-economic system, not exogenous factors that can be attributed to poor political decisions or bad luck. As Marx might have said, "Governments make their own policies, but they do not make them as they please; they do not make them under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past." That past - 40 years of neoliberalism - is notably absent in Milburn's report. The word does not appear once, and neither does capitalism nor socialism. In contrast, "welfare" appears 211 times.
The political division between left and right is whether the blame lies with a careless society or a weak generation. Both scrupulously avoid admitting that it is a failure of capitalism. Burnham, in particular, has avoided linking it to his 40 years of neoliberalism remark, which increasingly looks like mere rhetoric rather than any sort of analytical critique. Given that Milburn's recommendations are broadly the same as all the other recommendations on employment policy over the years - more targeted support paid for by less generous welfare - you have to wonder why the Prime Minister doesn't make the connection. What is it that will be different this time and thus likely to lead to a different outcome? Logic suggests that there is no diffrence and that this is deliberate because the desired outome is also the same. In other words, the purpose is not to question the actual system - contemporary capitalism - but to ameliorate its negative impacts by appealing to public conscience: we must do something for these kids, even if they don't like the medicine. The ideological core of Labourism is that work is the solution, hence Milburn's title: From a Welfare State to a Working State. Given his enthusiasm "to create opportunities for disadvantaged young people aligned to defence need" (section 323), we should be happy he isn't directing us to a Warfare State.
If we look at the government's own figure for NEET rates over time, it is clear that we are not in uncharted waters. The rate for 16-24 years olds has remained broadly constant with fluctuations attributable to the business cycle (the post-2009 recession), changes in education policy (the raising of the participation age in 2013), and exogneous factors like the Covid pandemic. The latter is significant in that most of the recent rise in the NEET rate, to around 13%, clearly correlates with the general trend of sluggish productivity growth across the economy as a whole. Milburn sets a target of 6.8% by 2036, but with the expectation of "a NEET rate that is consistently at around 5%" (section 142), something he wincingly refers to as "NEET Zero" (section 30). A target of 5% is not impossible, as The Netherlands has shown, but all the evidence suggests that this is geared not to better state management of support, or greater welfare conditionality, but to the availability of apprenticeships and other entry-level jobs with realistic career progression. The state can go some way to encouraging these, but not by coercing the young to stack shelves for supermarkets or insisting that doctors can't sign sick notes.
The NEET was invented in the late-1990s, and rates have only been consistently tracked since 2001, but if we combine them with the loosely comparable youth unemployment figures back to 1975 (arguably the start of the neoliberal era) then Milburn's ambition looks simply delusional, not least because of the secular fall in paid apprenticeships and the transition to a services-led economy in which highly-remunerative skills are increasingly concentrated in a narrow band at the job of the income distribution. What this highlights is that Milburn isn't trying to fix a temporary problem but is looking instead to reorganise society, something he is quite open about. But that reorganisation is intended to make labour more useful to capital, which is why it sounds like the usual Blairite prognosis with its emphasis on intervention and the dynamic instability of capitalism: "active labour market policies" (section 954) and "too many young people are being prepared in the education and skills system for a world of work that has already changed" (section 955). Peppered throughout the report is the usual technophilia, such as "a world of work that is being continuously reshaped by technology" (section 20), but now leavened by bien pensant caveats about "the amount of childhood lived through a screen" (section 361).
The problem is that Milburn's review was out-of-date before he started it, largely because he remains trapped in that Blairite mindset. The global economy is still something you cannot argue with, only placate. Interventions in the labour market are about sandpapering square pegs into round holes, rather than questioning the number and shape of the holes. At its heart, there is a renewed faith in public-private partnerships, which inevitably leads to the belief that business must be incentivised. As Milburn puts it, "Government cannot ask business to create more first opportunities while ignoring the effect its own decisions have on whether those opportunities are viable. ... A new bargain is needed. Employers should do more to create more first chances for young people. Government should make it easier, simpler, less costly and less risky for employers to do so" (sections 225 and 226). In practice this means lower employer NICs, a slowdown on the raising of the minimum youth wage, and straightforward cash subsidies. All of these serve to make labour cheaper, which disincentivises investment in capital. We may end up with a lower NEET rate, but at the cost of a drag on productivity.
It has been noted that Milburn's report places great burdens on many departments of government. While this may thrill Blairite true-believers like John Rentoul, it suggests that there will be plenty of pushback from ministers as much as backbenchers, even if they are being discreet at the moment, and that pushback will centre on the "radical reprioritisation" Milburn proposes. The most likely outcome then is that his holistic and systematic reconfiguration of state support for youth employment will largely be sidelined or watered down, as it will tread on too many toes. Meanwhile, the business-friendly changes will be embraced on the understanding that these will be paid for by cuts to the welfare bill, which the Treasury will insist are front-loaded to meet the government's manifesto-mandated fiscal rules. This then risks a repeat of Starmer and Reeves's struggle to force through cuts. It's possible that Burnham will balk at this, realising that Labour cannot afford to alienate the young, but what doesn't seem likely is that he will reject Milburn's proposals as the tired, failed prescriptions of a vanished world. At heart, what we're looking at is a failure of imagination.



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