Of Fictions and Factions

The media response to Andy Burnham's first week as Prime Minister has been both positive and sniffy. His communication skills have drawn praise, though doing a better job than Keir Starmer in this regard is just walking and chewing gum at the same time, to coin a phrase. His early announcements around the cost-of-living have been eye-catching but also small-beer in the grand fiscal scheme of things, while his willingness to start disappointing the left over defence spending and support for America's wars has brought a warm glow of contentment to Atlanticists everywhere. The Financial Times delivered a typical school report: "But so far, the parts of Burnhamonomics that are bold are not concrete, and those that are concrete are not bold." Meanwhile, the Grand Panjandrum of centrist opinion, Andrew Rawnsley, was prepared to be indulgent: "If the aim was to get off to a positive start, before pivoting away from sticking plasters and towards fixing the underlying problems, then perhaps some sketchy short-termist policies with sketchy funding is a price worth paying."

The most interesting response has focused on the reaction of those members of the Starmer cabinet who were promptly relieved of their duties on Monday. By Tuesday, Peter Walker in the Guardian reported that "Allies of Keir Starmer have questioned Andy Burnham’s pledge to end factional infighting after he removed or demoted more than half of the outgoing prime minister’s cabinet in his first reshuffle." The jarring detail here is the suggestion that Starmer had allies, as opposed to the contingent support of career opportunists. The man was promoted as a clean-skin who could gull the membership, but that just made him a willing (if ignorant) tool, not the intellectual pole around which a party tendency would coalesce. By Wednesday, this freshly-conjured grouping was being described by an unnamed Labour MP in a Politics Home report as "an incredibly powerful phalanx of skilled political operators who intimately know the government’s fiscal position", which sounded both delusional and threatening

Thursday was relatively quiet on the faction fabrication front but by Friday the Guardian had decided to go all in on the call-to-arms. According to Kiran Stacey, "Keir Starmer’s leaving party had been planned for some time. But in years to come it might be seen as the birth of a new Labour movement." By Sunday, Andrew Rawnsley had got with the programme: "Having previously said that he wanted to “move beyond” the “infighting” and “factionalism” that has “bedevilled us”, he sacked 11 cabinet ministers, many of whose common offence was declining to call for Sir Keir to quit. He then carried out a purge of Starmer loyalists in the junior ministerial ranks." Stacey's explanation for this sudden emergence was not the petulance and sense of entitlement of the likes of Darren Jones and Steve Reed but Starmer's own curious path to power: "One of Starmer’s biggest problems in government was that he did not have an identifiable faction of people who were willing to defend him at all costs – a symptom of both his late entry into politics and of his relative lack of ideology."

Given the ruthless purge conducted against the left of the party, the idea that Starmer lacked ideology or factional muscle is ridiculous, and that's before you consider his record in office, from unnecessarily persisting with austerity to backing Israel's "right" to murder civilians. For the last two years you would struggle to find anyone who would willingly identify as a "Starmerite", but now we are asked to believe that they are a disciplined army that could threaten a government majority of 158. The political press have a long tradition of inventing Labour factions, usually in order to isolate the socialist left - most notably the ever-useful and mutable "soft left", the Play-Doh of social democratic aspiration - but they've excelled themselves in conjuring a "movement" around the cypher of Keir Starmer and the totem of Rachel Reeves' fiscal rules. Stacey eventually concedes that this novel faction may only be the result of musical chairs: "But many of those whom Burnham sacked or demoted after entering office did have one thing in common: they were close to the former prime minister and had not called for him to resign."

Since Burnham won the Makerfield byelection, there has been a noticeable shift in the Guardian's use of the term "factionalism". During the Starmer era, it was rarely mentioned in the context of the expulsion of the left, despite that being a textbook factional operation that many participants were only to happy to brag about publicly, for example in Patrick Maguire and Gabriel Pogrund's tell-all book Get In. It is axiomatic to centrists that they are not factional, with the implications of blind loyalty and a refusal to face facts, while their critics are. Unsurprisingly, Rafael Behr now compares those disappointed opportunists with the "radical left", essentially to dismiss them as not serious people: "Labour’s radical left is always on a hair trigger, poised to denounce compromise as betrayal of socialist principle. Now there is also a small but aggrieved band of Starmer loyalists in exile poised to highlight (or relish) missteps and vulnerabilities." It's bad enough to lose your cabinet job, but to be expelled from the ranks of the sensible must really hurt.

The whining of Starmer's supposed "allies" is a return to the faux-factionalism of Blair/Brown, in which ideological congruity is obscured by personal hatred. The attempt to conjure the soft left as part of Ed Miliband's threat to market stability was shortlived, but you can expect that notional faction to reappear when the need once more arises. Andy Burnham was always going to get rid of the higher profile Starmer appointees to the cabinet, if only to emphasise that he was a new broom, so I don't think too much can be read into Reeves, Lammy, Reed, Kyle, Kendall, Hermer et al getting the elbow. None particularly distinguished themselves in office. Ed Miliband and Shabana Mahmood have offended many, at either end of the ideological spectrum, but they've also proved they can get stuff done, and Labour badly need tangible results by 2029. The same rationale explains why John Healey is now the latest Iron Chancellor: butter rations will be halved but we will definitely have more guns.

Insofar as the reshuffle advanced one faction over another, it was in the geographical rather than the ideological sense, with a noticeable shift to more Northern MPs in cabinet and particularly those from the North West. This is not just a symbolic attempt to push the narrative of devolution, reinforced by the launch of "Number 10 North" this week, but a reflection that Starmer was very reliant on a London core for his support, both in terms of MPs, party apparatchiks and the media. Whether this will impart a genuinely different flavour to the government is moot. It's notable that none of the MPs aligned with the Mainstream grouping, set up to counter the drift to the right under Starmer, got a sniff at a junior ministerial post. So far, Burnham does not look likely to diverge from the post-Thatcher consensus despite his early talk of an end to Neoliberalism and regrets over privatisation. A tilt towards Ordoliberalism, which historically valued devolution, seems more likely, which means there will be little challenge to property rights and little that is recognisably socialist.

In this context, the creation of factions serves to substitute court politics for the clash of interests that might have a more profound, and therefore destabilising, impact on policy. Though there have been the usual "warnings" from union leaders directed at Number 10, the discourse has barely featured the concerns of organised labour (outside of oil and gas jobs) any more than the particular concerns of civil society organisations. As usual, we've heard more from think-tanks than protest groups. Of course this is manna from heaven for political journalists and commentators, for whom ideology is a dirty word. Of the current political caucuses at Westminster, Blue Labour and the Labour Growth Group are likely to be absorbed into the main body of Burnham's support, while the soft left will remain quiescent. This leaves the for/against dichotomy familiar from the New Labour years but with those resentful of Burnham lacking any obvious champion, leading to the current absurdity of the Starmerite resistance. 

Looking back over the last 16 years, the PLP lacked the talent to succeed Blair and Brown, hence the Miliband(s) debacle and the runaway success of Corbyn. The result of that was the decision to import a leader from outside Westminster: first the unknown Starmer conning the membership; and then a recycled Burnham avoiding the need for an election through PLP discipline. What few are prepared to acknowledge is that this underlying dearth of talent, as much as the shenanigans, reflects the slow death of the Labour Party as an organic product of civil society, a process accelerated by the purge of the left. Burnham's municipalism (a more accurate label than Manchesterism) is a desperate attempt to reconnect with society through revitalised local government, even as it requires central government to mandate capped bus fares. The acid test will be council housebuilding. She wasn't central to the week's discourse, beyond ruling out rent controls, but the success of this government will probably now rest on the shoulders of Angela Rayner, the new Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government. She will no doubt shortly be awarded her own faction.

Burnhamesque

The symbolic moment of the handover of power between Keir Starmer and Andy Burnham this week was not the former's maudlin PMQs session but the leak that the latter is thinking of appointing Shabana Mahmood as Chancellor of the Exchequer. This may not actually come to pass, but what matters is the public emphasis placed on the need to keep the bond markets happy, and the private reassurance that it is the party right that remains firmly in charge, not the battalions of the soft left (once more conjured into existence by the media) massing behind "Red" Ed Miliband. Mahmood is not known for heterodox thinking on economics, while her stint as Shadow Financial Secretary to the Treasury lasted all of 4 months, ending when she resigned from the Shadow Cabinet the day after Jeremy Corbyn assumed the party leadership. It is that action that clearly commends her both to the PLP and to the media. 

In some ways it is remarkable that we have moved so quickly from the expectation that Andy Burnham would bring down the curtain on "40 years of Neoliberalism" (it was only in May) to a resigned acknowledgment that little will change. In June in The New Stateman, Michael Jacobs commended the sentiment but worried that Burnham might be fighting the last war, while Karel Williams and David Edgerton characterised the coming administration as likely to be "more of the same, with added vibes", a theme promptly picked up by Owen Jones in the Guardian as part of the campaign to get Miliband promoted. Since then, Burnham appears to have been speed-running Starmer's trajectory, caveating previous statements and rowing back on his assumed intentions, albeit having had the sense to not put much in writing. He is obviously not a man of cast-iron pledges but of cheery vibes, and that will probably help avoid repeating those tricky situations where a shifty Starmer was confronted with his bald lies. So far, Burnham has disappointed the left on Gaza and defence, and shows every sign of intending to disappoint them elsewhere too. 

Central to cartel politics is the idea of the markeplace of ideas, in which policy entrepreneurs compete to attract the admiring gaze of the political class in a sort of intellectual beauty contest conducted through the medium of slide-decks and chunky PDFs - i.e. in the manner of a business pitch. The ideological frame is clear enough, but so is the idea that politicians themselves have no fixed beliefs and are merely pragmatists interested in "what works". Burnham's victory in the Makerfield by-election prompted a rash of ideas that quickly coalesced under the title of Manchesterism. Matthew Lawrence and Alex Williams' paper on The Productive State, subtitled "A Framework for Manchesterism", is perhaps the most substantial offering to date, largely because it has been long-gestated at the Common Wealth think tank (someone must have been very pleased with herself for coming up with that name). The problem is that these ideas have been knocking around among progressives for some years now but, outside of the Corbyn/McDonnell interregnum, there has been litlle interest in them from the Labour Party.

Chris Dillow made the point that while Lawrence and Williams recognise the central issue of power - "The fundamental problem is ownership, not conduct. It is impossible to regulate away a problem created by ownership" - they offer little in the way of practical advice on how power can be acquired beyond noting that "Postwar nationalisations used government debt as compensation" and that "compulsory acquisition would typically require compensation based on fair market value, and acquiring assets materially below prevailing market valuations would likely require primary legislation and could face legal challenge." Given that public utilities and the NHS have been systematically looted for decades now, we surely need to question whether we want to re-enact the prim and proper approach of the Attlee government. Instead, the advocates of nationalisation today have been at pains to emphasise this pragmatism. Thus Larry Elliott in The Guardian noted that "Compensation to the owners of the mines and the big four rail companies was actually quite generous, which is why the nationalisation programme was relatively trouble-free." No shit.

This timidity is the consequence of the marketplace of ideas as much as ancestor-worship: the elevation of theory over practice, unless the latter is in the form of "reforms" to existing services and regulations - i.e. within the boundaries of neoliberal practice. Nobody at Common Wealth or the Resolution Foundation is going to put up a slide saying we need a general strike, a mass boycott or a refusal to pay. Revolutionary methods cannot be expected from the "radical realists" of Labour's latest grouping, Mainstream (just typing these labels is depressing), any more than we can expect them to invoke democracy and the people except at the most abstract level, hence the popularity of the phrase "public control", which is less about masking the preference for regulation over ownership than making the public a mere fetish. The competition for Andy Burham's ear is about securing influence over the mechanisms of the centralised state. For this reason, we should be sceptical about the talk of devolution.

The Productive State came out in June. I doubt many people still have much hope for its recommendations to be taken up by the new administration, or even for many of them to make their way, however heavily diluted, into the manifesto for the next general election. The media have focused their attention on the promise/threat of a wealth tax, the "debates" over whether we should junk Net Zero and the ECHR, and the need for more crackdowns on immigration and welfare. This is not simply a case of media-owners pursuing their own interests in those areas but a conscious attempt to narrow the government's bandwith, by "flooding the zone with shit", such that more radical ideas will be squeezed out. The debate over who should be Chancellor has similarly been conducted as a distracting and tedious contest between "Chaos with Ed Miliband" and whichever Labour politician looks most likely to continue Rachel Reeves' good work and do nothing to frighten the horses.

By July, the progressive end of the media was focused on prodding Burnham to consider practical solutions, such as Larry Elliott urging him to mandate the Bank of England "to provide a flow of low-cost, patient capital needed to fund the reindustrialisation strategy", an idea that obviously isn't going to survive contact with Shabana Mahmood, while Andy Beckett was insisting that "Overcoming Britain’s aversion to fundamental reform is not impossible. In the last century, David Lloyd George, Clement Attlee and Margaret Thatcher managed it, for three very different governments in three very different contexts". What Beckett didn't note was that the political context that gave them the authority to make radical change was actually the same: the kudos arising from a successful war, but also the recognition that the decades prior to the conflict could not be returned to. Burnham has made that acknowledgment, but he doesn't have the goodwill engendered by wartime sacrifice and victory.

Meanwhile, the helpful suggestions continue to come in from outside government, from rationalising the tax code to devolving power and finance to the regions. But when we turn to the ideas emanating from within government, we find a call to stop "simply writing a cheque" for health and disability benefit claimants, which sound awfully like a return to workfare. The other symbolic moment of the week was the passage of the Hillsborough Law - the Public Office (Accountability) Bill - in the House of Commons after much foot-dragging by the government over the security services' duty of candour (a major issue in respect of the Manchester Arena bombing). Burnham has been a  sincere champion for this cause, at least since he was publicly booed at a memorial ceremony held at Anfield in 2009, but the long delay in the passage of the bill indicates the limits of state reform, as much as the resilience of the campaigners. Burnham claim that the bill is "truly a rewiring of the state" is hyperbole.

In summary, there is little reason to believe that Burnham will be the social democratic saviour of the country that some were pining for back in May, but his deft media footwork and his willingness to cast greater regulation, whether by Whitehall or local authorities, as populist activism may be enough to save the Labour Party from electoral oblivion. The creation of some new public corporations, an emphasis on the common good, and an unabashed promotion of the state as a regulator of markets, all intended to help alleviate the cost-of-living through an attack on rentierism and private monopolies, may be enough for many voters. The irony is that the man promising an end to Neoliberalism may turn out to be the first truly Ordoliberal Prime Minister of the UK.

You Have to Want to Change

The Global Justice Project is an initiative whose aim is "to stimulate research, policymaking, and citizen engagement to shape a fairer, more democratic and sustainable 21st century". Though a collective effort, the project has been closely identified in the media with Thomas Piketty, which has inevitably led to curt dismissal by those who either deny that wealth inequality has grown or that it is driving the erosion of democracy and the degradation of the planet, and have done so since the Frenchman published Capital in the Twenty First Century in 2013. While that mighty tome proposed a globally-coordinated wealth tax, the GJP proposes three key initiatives in line with its more holistic ambitions and the expertise of the collective: fast decarbonisation of energy systems; a shift away from overconsumption towards sufficiency, which would entail a sharp reduction in labour hours and the use of raw materials; and "a drastic reduction in inequality of income, wealth and power, between countries and within them." Parallel to this, leading progressive economists, including Piketty, have also signed up to a roadmap to "end poverty and inequalities on a liveable planet", as proposed by Olivier De Schutter, the former UN Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights.

Rather than getting into the detail of the proposals, what I'd like to consider is the political viability of such radical change and what that in turn might look like on a smaller, more domestic stage - i.e. the UK. Dan Neidle, the British tax lawyer who has become a media fixture since his retirement from Clifford Chance, largely by publishing opinion about the tax affairs of prominent individuals and shaking his head wearily at the government, dismissed the GJP, aka "Tomas Piketty and a large team", as "potty" (Noah Smith called it "total nonsense"). Neidle's central claim is that it would require "unprecedented global cooperation" and "a powerful and benign world authority", but that if such things were possible they would already exist and we would therefore already have solved the problems of decarbonisation, over-consumption and inequality. He describes this as a circular argument. In fact, what he is offering is a non sequitur. Bretton Woods (the WTO, the World Bank) was a system of "unprecedented global cooperation", but it did not raise up the developing world or restrain global warming. Equally, the US has long claimed to be "a powerful and benign world authority" (not least through the exorbitant privilege of the dollar), but sees fit to attack other countries, murder non-combatants and kidnap heads of state at will (that's just this year).

It is perfectly reasonable to be sceptical of the GJP's ambitions, particularly when you consider the track record of other attempts at global coordination of the economy and climate, such as GATT and COP. But those initiatives have run into the sand because there are competing interests between nations. The classic example is the desire of developing countries to catch up economically before the music stops and planetary constraints oblige us to move to a steady state or even degrowth. The GJP explicitly addresses this through wealth transfers (and does likewise for domestic inequality). Whether you think that is politically feasible is another matter. The point is that history is littered with examples of international wealth transfers, specifically in the form of colonial empire. What is being proposed now is a coordinated transfer of accumulated wealth (think of it as reparations plus) rather than genocide, slavery and coercive exploitation. Even on the more modest scale of regional cooperation, the flow of money between net contributors and net beneficiaries in the European Union over decades has shown that transfers are hardly Utopian. 

If we think the degree of international coordination needed to implement the GJP's proposals is unrealistic, perhaps we should return to the idea of "socialism in one country", specifically the UK. Might Andy Burnham's proposed break with "40 years of neoliberalism" offer a more realistic course towards a radical reimagining of our political economy? According to David Edgerton & Karel Williams, writing in the New Statesman, "What we have is more of the same, with added vibes, plus a reversal of policy in certain areas, at the limits of what Labour radicalism will permit. It represents something more like political rhetoric than political change: when Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair are associated with the free market, competition and private finance, it is argued that a small reversal in policy will itself improve things." Again, the point to emphasise is not that reversing the Thatcherite/Blairite dispensation is too challenging to even consider, but that there is a lack of political will to do so. Burnham is currently making promises left right and centre to win election as an MP and potentially as Prime Minister, but he doesn't look like a man with a radical plan.

Edgerton and Williams see the foundational economy and universal basic services as the vector for more profound social and economic change: "Improving household liveability should be the focus of expenditure. This should include making essential market goods affordable, ensuring foundational services work and are accessible, and integrating policies around the goals of preventing social harm and promoting environmental responsibility and social solidarity. We need to think about expansion of domestic food production as well as reforming food distribution and consumption." They make good points, notably that radical change to our political economy must start from tax reform ("Our tax system remains stuck in the 1940s when PAYE was introduced to tax the individual male bread winner"), but I feel their focus on "the four market essentials – housing, utilities, energy and transport" misses that one of those, housing, is an 800-pound gorilla. There is also a wider problem here, which we see with mainstream commentators as well, which is to view measures to alleviate poverty in supply-side terms ("making essential market goods affordable"). 

The UK economy has proven highly vulnerable in recent years to fluctuations in energy prices, arguably more so than in the 1970s when oil-fuelled inflation triggered labour militancy to push up wages in response. Then it caused inflation, but that was more of an issue for rentiers than for working households. Today, there is no countervailing tendency to force wages to keep pace with rising household costs (despite the Bank of England's attempt to revive the bogey of the "wage-price spriral"), with the result that even relatively small increases in energy costs can trigger a cost-of-living crisis as they impact other essentials such as food and transport. But this lack of financial resilience isn't simply down to weaker trade unions but to the fact that housing costs take up so much of household income, and to the fact that the dynamic is for those costs to expand as much as possible. In other words, there is simply no slack in most household budgets. Reforming planning laws to encourage more housebuilding will not alleviate poverty so long as rents are set by the market, both because developers are incentivised to build higher value properties and because those regulatory reforms will make it easier to do so.

It would be nice to fix our sewers and reservoirs, and fully electrify our railways and modernise the NHS, but this requires a level of real resources significantly greater than can be produced domestically, essentially because of 40 years of deindustrialisation following Thatcher's misguided Monetarism and Blair's equally misguided belief in a financial services-led economy. We could import resources - steel, bricks, engineers - but this would require us to export an equivalent amount or risk a balance of payments crisis and inflation. So, if we have only limited real resources, what should we prioritise? I would suggest that we focus on social housing initially. Not only does this address a pressing need, but it also gives us the opportunity to materially affect household spending by deliberately lowering rents, a policy that would be extended to existing council houses and flats. You might argue that this will deprive hard-pressed councils of revenue, but there is a solution to that as well, which is to buy out private landlords (using central government money - essentially by issuing mortgage-backed securities) and so increase council stock and revenues (even if those previously private tenants see their rents reduced in line with council rents).

This looks like a subsidy, but in fact it is simply deferred income as the rent can be increased once the cost of other essentials come down. So long as the investment - i.e. the cost to build and maintain - is recouped over the useful life of the asset (hopefully many decades in the case of housing - most UK council houses are over 50 years old) the timing of payments is simply a matter of cashflow, and that really isn't an issue for a monetary sovereign. Just as welfare spending is an automatic stabilisier of aggregate demand in a recession, so we should flex rents to help social tenants meet spikes in the cost of basics. This is a more practical approach than capping utility bills or freezing grocery prices. That the cost of living debate has been limited to those proposals, and the predictably choleric response of market fundamentalists, tells you how wedded the media have become to the idea that the crisis is a supply-side issue rather than the consequence of inadequate demand, and specifically demand among low income families. It sometimes feels like no one at the BBC has ever heard of Keynes.

Lowering rents is functionally no different to lowering interest rates that feed through to lower monthly mortgage repayments. The difference comes down to who benefits: tenants or mortgage-holders. The state currently has limited control over interest rates, due to the self-denying ordinance that is the Bank of England's "independence", and apparently no control over gilt yields (though in reality these are tied to inflation expectations and thus other government decisions). But it has complete control, if it wishes to exercise it, over council houses and their rents. After all, without that control Right-to-Buy would never have got off the ground, and nor would the Thatcher government have been able to impose an effective moratorium on building replacements for the properties sold off. The learned helplessness of British politics means that we easily forget the power of the state to remake society, even when such changes have been made in recent memory. It is no surprise then that more ambitious changes, on a global scale, are met with derision. But we should always remember a simple truth, most recently stated by Simon Wren-Lewis: "levels of poverty and inequality are what political elites and their influencers want them to be". That we have a government elected on the promise of "change" that has decided to change little does not mean that change is impossible, but that change is simply not what the government and its primary backers want.

The Starmer Legacy

To no one's surprise, the local election results have led to the demand, both inside and outside the Labour Party, that Keir Starmer stands down as Prime Minister. While short-lived premierships are not unknown, particularly over the last decade, Starmer's fall is spectacular. A man who arguably rose without a trace is destined for well-deserved obscurity. The first point to make is that his limited popularity started to drop immediately after Labour's general election triumph in 2024 when only 34% of the vote secured the party 63% of the seats in the House of Commons. His performance since then, from the winter fuel allowance fiasco to his support for Israeli war crimes in Gaza, has accelerated this trend, but he was never popular to begin with, even among Labour Party members and supporters who had seen him steadily renege on all the promises he made to win election as party leader. With the end of his ultimately barren political career imminent, the question we have to ask is what was the significance of Starmer? We understand the shenanigans and dumb luck that propelled him into Downing Street, but why him and why now?

Some commentators have taken to wondering if the country has become ungovernable, or if we are cursed by zombie politics, or if the problem is simply that our politics is fundamentally stupid. The common theme here is learned helplessness. The elevation of Starmer as first party leader and then Prime Minister is perhaps evidence that the country didn't think it could do any better, a feeling that persists and means Starmer will probably remain in situ for a while yet. Labour Party members may bemoan that they were deceived, but anyone remotely engaged with politics in 2019 could have told them that this was on the cards. Starmer was the clean-skin of the right, with the backing of shadowy Blairite fixers like Mandelson and McSweeney, and would purge the left as soon as he could. Likewise, the much-ridiculed claim in 2020 by the historian Glen O'Hara that what mattered was managerial competence - "Starmer can chair a meeting. He can draft a minute. He can lead a team. He can hold a press conference" - was quite simply a counsel of despair: a paean to lowered expectations, not an encomium. The irony is that subsequent events, and the anonymous briefings about his indecisiveness and lack of political nous, have shown that initial assessment to have been optimistic.

To understand the meaning of Starmer we have to put him, and this pervasive sense of learned helplessness, in its historical context. Unfortunately, this doesn't suit the fashionable concerns of our media, for whom history is just so much going over old ground and old arguments and so to be avoided. But this ahistoricism is also to be found among those who pride themselves on taking a longer view. For example, Simon Wren-Lewis thinks there was a change in the intellectual rigour of government between 2003 and 2008: "After these years when evidence-based policy making was the ideal, it was a genuine puzzle as to why the Western world had collectively decided to ignore basic macroeconomics and cut government spending in the middle of the worst recession since WWII when interest rates were stuck at their lower bound. Yet from today’s perspective, where everything from harvesting policy-based evidence to simple lying is so endemic, it all seems much less of a puzzle." But you might as well ask why the government adopted similar austerity measures in the 1930s when there was credible advice (notably from John Maynard Keynes) to do otherwise. The answer is: they did it because it was in their class interests to do so, not because of some sudden lapse in character. 

The idea that New Labour was wedded to evidence-based policy-making is obviously a myth (2003 was also the year of the instrumental lying over Iraq), but so too is Wren-Lewis's claim that "Brexit marked the first triumph of populism in the UK." Contemporary rightwing populism is marked by an anti-state fiscal obsession ("We'll make public spending savings and deliver tax cuts"), by xenophobia ("The immigrants are to blame for society's ills"), and by a belief that traitorous "elites" are undermining the nation (often in cahoots with the immigrants). If we're looking for this worldview's first triumph in British politics, surely the place to start is Margaret Thatcher's ascension to the leadership of the Conservative Party. Whatever her preferences in economic or political theory (monetarism, Hayek etc), her rise was founded on the idea that the establishment was rotten (the "wets", the traitorous BBC), had sold out to left-leaning elites (the trade union "barons", the liberal public sector that derided Victorian values), and was cultivating ethnic minorities against the interests of the nation ("people are really rather afraid that this country might be rather swamped by people with a different culture"). Curbing organised labour, restraining "loony left" councils, and imposing the national curriculum in education were all populist measures.

One explanation that Wren-Lewis offers is the role of the press in advocating austerity after the great financial crash: "The media made it hard for opposition Labour voices to argue that the government was going too fast, too hard on cuts, so Labour eventually gave up." But this is inaccurate. Alistair Darling was already promising deep, real-terms spending cuts in 2009. He may not have made a virtue of it, as George Osborne did, but there was unquestionably a political consensus on austerity even before the 2010 general election. Thereafter, Labour's opposition to the cuts was little more than quibbling, which directly led to the election of Jeremy Corbyn in 2015 on a platform of actually opposing the cuts (a point Wren-Lewis is willing to concede in a footnote). The question that should be asked is why there was a cross-party consensus on austerity in 2009. Can it be solely attributed to this country's horrendous media? Again, a comparison with the 1930s suggest that the economic orthodoxy - that budgets must be balanced through spending cuts and/or tax rises during a recession - was hegemonic across the major parties, hence the split in Labour in 1931.

Wren-Lewis continues: "The right wing media is hardly a source of informed and balanced commentary. To some extent that has always been true, but it does seem to have got worse over the last few decades: just look at the Daily Telegraph, or GB news. The transformation of social media, to the extent that it influences political debate and discourse, has been more dramatic, and is now clearly a source of simplistic views that tend to match those of its owners." Again, the British press is no more reprehensible than it has ever been. It hasn't got worse, it simply started out bad amidst the imperialist jingo of the late nineteenth century (when expanded literacy and growing affordability led to a boom in newsprint) and has never got any better. Simon's suggestion that social media reflects only the views of its rightwing owners is bizarre, particularly coming from someone who is quite active online and regularly gets into spats with people whose views are a million miles away from Elon Musk or Rupert Murdoch.

My point in all this is that British politics has been on a populist trajectory since at least the 1970s but one that obscures a much more persistent conservatism. You could see the Major years and New Labour as a countermovement to Thatcherite populism, but in fact continuity was more obvious than change, hence the persistence of the fundamental economic dispensation (shrinking the state's role, protecting investors, restraining organised labour), the running sore of xenophobia (recast in terms of "bogus asylum-seekers"), the general tendency towards authoritarianism (ASBOs), and the  systematic marketisation of the welfare state. That said, there was a discernible shift in the political landscape around the millennium, arising from fundamental changes in political economy and the material base. Keir Starmer's ascension can be seen as emblematic of the way that three specific developments associated with this shift worked themselves out. They are: the intellectual bankruptcy of the political centre; the assisted death of the Labour Party by its own right wing; and the terminal delinquency of the press.

The political centre as a distinctive body of thought (the Third Way) came to prominence in the 1990s first under Bill Clinton in the US and then under Tony Blair in the UK. But it was already crumbling, essentially because the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 marginalised the idea of socialism for a generation. This meant that the premise of a middle way, a grand bargain between social democracy and free markets, was no longer required, which led to the era of liberal triumphalism and ultimately the folly of both Iraq and the dominance of financialisation. With the return of socialism as a viable alternative after 2008, if only rhetorically, centrist politics found itself without any space for manoeuvre - there was no meaningful middle way to plot any longer with social democracy all but gutted - obliging it to make common cause with conservatives in defence of the market. This was a key contributor to the emergence of cartel politics, with its emphases on fiscal orthodoxy, technocracy and the exclusion of the illegitimate fringe. It also compromised the media (the influence is bidirectional) by encouraging the idea that political journalism was about policing the boundaries of the cartel. The result of this in the UK has been the conscious strategy of Labour to replace the Conservatives as the dominant party on the centre-right, pursuing largely the same policies but with an appeal to managerial competence and recourse to the mawkish class sentimentality embodied by Starmer ("My dad was a toolmaker").

This shift explains the purging of the Labour left, a move that Starmer has taken to a level that would have been unthinkable to the likes of Hugh Gaitskell or Neil Kinnock. It's easy to dismiss the Labour right as slaves to factionalism and spite, but while this is a fair assessment of the pyschology of many individuals, the underlying dynamic is a pragmatic realisation that you cannot be a centre-right party and have a socialist leftwing. Fluffy liberals (aka the soft left), yes; Marxists, no. The problem that Labour faces is that while it has defined the left and right "extremes", in the form of the Greens and Reform, it hasn't managed to squeeze the fillings in the political club sandwich: the Liberal Democrats between it and the Greens, and the Conservatives between it and Reform. The reason for this is Starmer's lack of credibility, which is a consequence of his route to power. Many people have longstanding political loyalties (and antipathies), and Labour has been unable to provide a charismatic leader in the mould of Blair capable of reconstructing the party's electoral base. The problem for the Labour right today is that they don't have anyone of that calibre in waiting.

The third development is the economic decline of the press. This has been offset not by recourse to social media, as Simon Wren-Lewis imagines, but by the colonisation of TV. GB News is simply a visual tabloid - somewhere between the Sun and the Daily Mail - while political coverage on the BBC, ITV and Channel 4 has descended to little more than apeing the comment pages of the Times, the Telegraph and the Guardian. With newspapers increasingly consumed online with multimedia content, and with the decline of linear broadcasting leading to TV journalism being chopped up into short videos, and increasingly dominated by longer-form creator content, a merger of the two forms seems inevitable. This gradual process has led the press to become ever more directive about how TV should conduct itself. Whereas once Rupert Murdoch's interests were in breaking up broadcasting monopolies and undermining the state broadcaster, his successors will be far more interested in securing control of those broadcasters' political coverage. Were we to revive the Leveson 2 Inquiry, its scope would have to be considerably widened.

The significance of Starmer is to be found in the Labour Party's demographic challenges. Its skilled working class electoral core had shrunk through the twin pressures of deindustrialisation and embourgeoisement in the 1980s and 90s, leading to the New Labour reconfiguration around totems like "Worcester woman". But this obscured that its actual core vote was increasingly minorities and the educated but economically precarious young clustered in cities. The decision to colonise the centre-right, thereby marginalising both the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats, required it to adopt an electoral strategy focused on post-industrial small towns and white-coded social conservatives ("Workington man"), along with the comfortable (and multi-ethnic) professional middle class from which its own candidates now largely hail. Purging the left was seen as attractive to both groups. The result of this, as seen in the local elections, has been the erosion of its urban core but no compensation in small towns. The latter is less to do with the success of Reform than the fact that small towns also have young and ethnic minority voters, not to mention more mature "lefties", many of whom are now shifting to the Greens in England and Plaid Cymru and the SNP in Wales and Scotland, allowing Reform to win on low vote shares much as Labour did in the 2024 general election.

The learned helplessness of the current political conjuction arises partly from this conscious attempt to reconfigure the party landscape. The centrist media's obsession with "populism" - i.e. the disparaging frame for emergent demands from outside the cartel for a "new politics" - together with its unwillingness to properly investigate the Labour Party's purging of the left as a political endeavour, rather than the "crisis of antisemitism", means that this strategy of reconfiguration has little salience in political analysis. At best, the attempt to win over social conservatives is described as the recapture of the party's historic core of non-graduate, manual labour (the "white working class"). Likewise, the decline of the Conservative Party is seen chiefly through the prism of the "revolt on the right" and the legacy of Brexit: a failure to resist the seductive powers of Nigel Farage rather than a failure to resist Labour's march onto its traditional territory. Prior to 1995 (i.e. the start of New Labour), no Conservative MP had defected directly to the Labour Party in its history. Since then, seven have, with an acceleration in recent years.

In addition to this increasingly volatile party landscape, the other factor encouraging the learned helplessness of the politico-media caste is the steady decline of state capability following the UK's extensive application of privatisation and outsourcing since the 1980s. This has seen government increasingly adopt the role of a regulator, setting targets and parameters, rather than an author of action. The recent Whitehall farce of the inquiry into Peter Mandelson's appointment as ambassador to the US was an object lesson not only in obfuscation and avoidance but a clear sign that there remains a gulf of understanding between government and the Civil Service. The former is driven by announcements and "resets" - performative actions that achieve little - and remains baffled that there are no levers of power that it can simply pull to get the desired outcome. The latter suffers the delusion that it has control over fragmented processes that long ago breached the boundaries of the state, ironically returning us to the culture of corruption and the promotion of "interests" that marked the era before the Northcote-Trevelyan reforms.

Keir Starmer will likely cling onto office for a while yet, not simply because there are no compelling alternatives among the PLP ranks (Streeting is obviously Marmite, even among that narrow constituency) but because the wider Labour movement is enervated (trade union general secretaries may publish their demands in the Guardian or Daily Mirror but they won't actually do anything) and the soft left remains a disorganised wannabe faction that lacks a coherent ideology ("Manchesterism" is little more than municipal buses - i.e. mitigating market failures). But perhaps I too am indulging in learned helplessness. Perhaps if Andy Burnham returns to Parliament he might recommit Labour to a robust social democracy that defies the financial markets and unwinds the damage done by both New Labour (of which he was a minister) and the Tory misrule of the last decade and a half. Perhaps. Pessimism of the intellect and optimism of the will, and all that. But I can't help feeling that the legacy of Keir Starmer, at the controls of a driverless train whose route was set by others, will be a diminished Labour Party that eventually convinces itself the best course of action in a fragmented political landscape will be a coalition with the parties to its right, rather than its left.

I Can't Hear You

The Israeli-born and now US-based Holocaust historian Omer Bartov has been on a journey. Returning on a visit to Israel in August 2024, he was deeply disturbed not only by the rhetoric of IDF soldiers protesting at the very idea of coexistence with the Palestinians of Gaza but at the degree to which such views had become the common sense of the country. He identified two sentiments: a fear and rage that "threatens to make war into its own end", and "the utter inability of Israeli society today to feel any empathy for the population of Gaza". The parallel with his own study of European societies in the 1930s and 40s should be obvious. A year later, Bartov wrote a noted article for the New York Times - I’m a Genocide Scholar. I Know It When I See It - in which he reluctantly came to the conclusion that Israel was "committing genocide against the Palestinian people". Bartov has now published a book - Israel: What Went Wrong? - in which he discusses how this acceptance of genocide came about, and more particularly how Zionism evolved from a movement of liberation to a settler-colonial project.

I've not read the book, and probably won't because the arguments as summarised in his interview with the Guardian are already well-known. Chief among them is "the original sin of Israel’s founding, the resistance to granting meaningful legal weight to the lofty words contained in the nation’s declaration of independence, coupled with the founders’ subsequent failure to adopt a national constitution and bill of rights." The determination of Israel's first Prime Minister, David Ben Gurion, to avoid enshrining citizenship in a constitution, thereby either having to grant rights to Palestinians in situ or immediately formalise a system of apartheid, was not some personal eccentricity but the core of the new state's rationale. As such, genocidal intent has been there since the expansion of Jewish immigration in the 1920s and 30s, even before the foundation of the state of Israel in 1948. To imagine that Zionism has only lately been perverted, that it has "become" genocidal, is to ignore the logic of its declared goal to create an exclusive Jewish homeland. This is the delusion of liberal Zionism: that there was ever the possibility of satisfying the Zionist cause while also respecting the rights of Palestinians. Ben Gurion recognised this.

What is interesting, if depressing, about Bartov's journey is that he still holds out hope for the return of a liberal Israel. As the interview notes, "Bartov does see a narrow path toward the nation’s peaceful coexistence with its neighbors. A section of the book is devoted to the confederation plan championed by a group of Israeli and Palestinian intellectuals called A Land for All – a version of which was originally considered by the United Nations in 1947. Under this scheme, sovereign and independent Palestinian and Jewish states would exist side by side, divided roughly along pre-1967 borders. Citizens of both entities would be allowed to live and travel freely throughout the combined territory, but would vote only in their own national elections – "not unlike the way an Italian, for example, can live and work anywhere in the EU while voting in Italy." Before getting into the details of what this plan actually means, or how such a Utopia might come about, it's worth marvelling at the strained parallel with the EU.

The first point to make is that the previous version (the "Partition Plan") failed in 1947 because it was so obviously biased. The Jewish state would have 56% of the Mandatory Territory, the Palestinians would have 43% (the remaining 1% being an internationally-administered Jerusalem and Bethlehem). At the time, the Palestinian (and non-Jewish minority) population was twice the size of the Jewish population: 1.2m versus 600k. Among other things, this would have meant that 45% of the Jewish state population would be Palestinian. Given everything that has happened since, notably the mass expulsions of the Nakba in the following year, it is reasonable to assume they would have been second class citizens and encouraged to depart. The Arab states at the UN clearly saw this as a land-grab and voted against it. The second point to make is that the "pre-1967" borders were not those of 1947 but of 1949, after the First Arab-Israeli War when Israel increased its share of the former Mandatory Territory to 78%, reducing the Palestinians to the West Bank and Gaza. What happened in 1967 was that Israel then took over those areas as well and set about steadily eroding them through settlements and military exclusion zones.

The latest iteration of the confederation plan, as explained by Dahlia Scheindlin, is a liberal attempt to craft a solution that avoids pluralism in any form. It is presented in contrast to two inferior alternatives: "the two solutions usually discussed by policymakers: the failed “two-state solution” framework of the Oslo Accords of 1993, and the “one-state reality”—the currently emerging de facto condition of a single state of Israeli citizens and oppressed Palestinian subjects." What is not to be considered is the single state solution - i.e. equal rights for Palestinians in a merged Israel and Palestine. This is because Zionism always trumps liberalism in liberal Zionism. The plan has obvious echoes of 1947 in its asymmetry. For example, "Palestinian refugees can attain Palestinian citizenship, along with the right of residency in Israel. Existing Israeli settlers will retain Israeli citizenship with residency rights in Palestine if they abide Palestinian laws and sovereignty, and most will not be expelled from where they currently reside." Compare "can" to "will". In other words, the illegal settlements in the West Bank will remain. The freedom of movement and residency is "to be implemented over time", which may mean never.

On the question of enfranchisement, the plan proposes that "Palestinians and Israelis will be able to vote in the national elections of their respective states and in local elections, in whichever state they reside." The problem this gives rise to is the tension it creates between the grant of residency and political influence. Palestinian refugees currently in Lebanon or Jordan aren't going to be granted residency in Israel, and indeed there is every reason to suspect that Israeli Arabs would become more vulnerable: "Palestinians who already have Israeli citizenship will retain it, with the option to have dual citizenship in Palestine." As the UK showed with Shamima Begum, dual citizenship is handy if you want to expel a nominal citizen. Will Palestinians in the West Bank be granted residency in West Jerusalem if they can then form a decisive voting bloc in local elections? The suggestion is that it would be the capital of both states but "structured, by institutional design, to represent both communities", which sounds like the power-sharing that has led to paralysis in Northern Ireland. As that parallel indicates, the likely outcome is for local government to become attenuated and more power reserved to the national authority - i.e. direct rule.

The confederation plan is a phantastic object meant to assuage the cognitive dissonance of Israeli progressives and their supporters in the West. At the heart of the Zionist project is the rejection of pluralism in favour of ethnic exclusivity, the original argument that split Jewish opinion between the Zionist nationalists and the socialist Bund. Liberal opinion in Israel survived for decades by denying this reality in favour of a mythos built on self-defence, cultural superiority and a self-conscious democracy. But this has been too difficult to maintain since the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin and the failure of the Oslo process. Israeli society has become more intolerant towards dissent in its own ranks, with the political left redundant and religious conservatism on the rise. Liberal opinion is now firmly on the right of the political spectrum, more concerned with the image of liberalism than its active practice. This isn't exclusive to Israel: this drift to the right is visible in most countries. But Israel has a particularly acute case of it because it is engaged in systematic violence, from settler assaults in the West Bank (deplored but not restrained) to the invasion of Southern Lebanon.

The latter outrage is symbolically important because that country exists as an affront to Israel. As Ussama Makdisi puts it, "Israel’s expansion into Lebanon and apparent weaponization of Lebanon’s religious diversity ultimately underscores its own commitment to its prevailing ideology as a Jewish state committed to subjugating its regional environment: from the occupied Palestinian territories to the Syrian Golan Heights, and now to southern Lebanon. In that way, Lebanon is its antithesis: a state that reflects, however imperfectly, an indigenous pluralism." Makdisi notes that "Hezbollah does not resist Israel simply because it is a Shiite organization supported by Iran; it resists Israel primarily because Israel has repeatedly invaded, scorched and occupied Lebanese land, and because Israel uprooted and terrorized its community." The attempt to cast Hezbollah as simply an Iranian proxy is a conscious tactic to undermine Lebanon as a state and to suggest that the centuries-old Shiite presence in the south of the country is anomalous as much as it is is a threat to Israel. In other words, Lebanon's legitimacy as a state is called into question by virtue of its multi-ethnicity and its historic attempts at power-sharing. Israel has repeatedly undermined the latter over the years, not just for contingent tactical advantage but because it vehemently rejects power-sharing in principle.

This rejection of pluralism is increasingly visible in the diaspora as well. The current demand is that solidarity with the Jewish community against antisemitism must be exclusive, not qualified by appeals to a wider anti-racism and certainly not tainted by association with the idea of equal rights for Palestinians. This is a demand that some in the West have been happy to cynically exploit for domestic political gain, thereby denigrating the entirety of progressive causes in some cases. It might seem odd that this line has been pushed in particular by the Guardian, but that paper's commitment to liberal Zionism is arguably its most consistent value since the millennium. Leftists arguing that anti-Zionism is not antisemitism fail to appreciate that for many Jews they are identical because they have come to identify Israel exclusively with Zionism. There is no domestic anti-Zionist opposition to speak of, outside of those with religious scruples, while diaspora anti-Zionists are routinely dismissed as self-hating Jews.

Israeli society is, as Omer Bartov noted, fearful and angry and lacking in empathy. It should come as no surprise that Jews in the UK are encouraged to exhibit the same traits, if only in sympathy with Israel. The refusal to accept that sincere anti-racists can deplore antisemitism as much as Islamophobia or the denial of Palestinian rights is necessary because to admit otherwise would be to accept the contention that anti-Zionism is not antisemitism, and that would be a betrayal of Israel or, to put it in Bartov's terms, what it has become. The demand for solidarity with the Jewish community therefore comes with strings attached. You cannot dilute it by extending your empathy to other communities. Your solidarity must be exclusive. For liberal newspapers steadily backtracking on their support for progressive causes, from trans rights to the NHS, this is a model exercise in virtue but also a wonderful opportunity to express their contempt for the left. "Where are those who are usually so vocal in their opposition to racism" asks Jonathan Freedland, a man who has had his fingers in his ears for decades.

Local and Global

There's a new think-tank in town. Verdant introduces itself as "A new kind of think tank for a just and green future". Let me say from the start that I'm all in favour of justice and environmental responsibility, and the initial proposals are progressive, but what I'm interested in here is the form that this endeavour has taken (implied by that "new kind"), what that says about its future trajectory, and what that might mean for Green Party policy in thorny areas beyond justice and the climate, such as social, economic and foreign policy. It would be easy to dismiss Verdant as James Meadway and a couple of eager kids in a trenchcoat, and the Guardian's framing of its initial report on efficiency savings as a "Doge of the left" was clearly patronising, though James sensibly welcomed the publicity, but what its launch immediately confirms is that there is an appetite for new thinking on the left, which reflects both the intellectual void that is the current Labour Party and the dedicated obscurantism of Your Party. The question is, what does Verdant see as the gap in the market?

I put it in those terms because what is striking is the way that Verdant has positioned itself in the mainstream of think tank culture, with its emphasis on the marketplace of ideas and its employment of generic business-speak. Again, this looks tactically astute as it increases the chances of coverage by the likes of the Guardian and even Bloomberg, which previewed the launch back in December as an "attempt to bridge the distance between party members who favor radical socialist reform, and those who recognize the UK’s dependence on international investors for its debt-financing requirements and want to swing left while keeping bond markets on-side." What this in turn suggests is that Verdant will avoid creating easy targets for dismissal and derision by the media, so don't expect dense essays on Modern Monetary Theory, let alone Critical Race Theory. What we can expect is adherence to liberal shibboleths such as pragmatism and fiscal prudence. As co-founder Deborah Doane describes it, Verdant is "a deliberate effort to build the kind of institutional power that turns positive environmental and socially just ideas – especially underpinned by sound economic thinking – into deliverable political outcomes". 

The implication of a focus on practical policy is that the Greens are on the verge of power, or at least of sufficient Parliamentary leverage to influence a future government. The emphasis on "sound economic thinking" shows that they recognise the biggest threat to the project would be to be labelled as fiscally incontinent and thus administratively incompetent, which in turn makes it clear that this will be a well-behaved left initiative - i.e. green-tinged social democracy. That Doane's opening blog post foregrounds Liz Truss is not simply to decry the pernicious influence of the Tufton Street eco-system of rightwing think tanks. It is also intended to offer reassurance to the markets. At some point, Verdant will come up against the hard constraints of contemporary political economy (constraints becoming ever more apparent with the fallout from the war on Iran), but for now the greater constraints are those of the think tank sector itself.

Chief among these is the idea that think tanks are producers launching new wares into a choosy market: "Have you considered beige, madam?" The model of policy entrepreneurship originates in the American political system and was driven by two trends. One was the growing role of market research and opinion polling in the development of policy from the 1950s onwards, and the other was the growing role of money in determining policy priorities. This combination arrived in the UK, boosted by Margaret Thatcher's cultivation of the neoliberal thought collective, in the 1970s. Prior to that, policy think tanks tended to be straighforwardly partisan, such as the Fabians and the Bow Group, or had originated in charitable endeavours concerned with social policy that acquired an invigilatory role in an expanded welfare state, such as the Nuffield Trust, King's Fund and the Joseph Rowntree Foundation. Neoliberal hegemony has meant that, regardless of their historical origins or ideological bent, think tanks today subscribe to a common style when it comes to what they deliver (the commodified report, the press release etc) and the language they employ in delivering it (the vocabulary is a mix of corporate-speak, journalese and the tropes of academic respectability).

Verdant's homepage starts by saying "We are committed to shaping inclusive policies that don’t just analyse ideas; we build them collaboratively, bringing citizens and experts together to design the next chapter of progressive politics in the UK. We want to ensure that the people most affected by policies help to shape and refine them, strengthening their legitimacy with politicians, media and the public." That is good as it emphasises inclusion and democratic legitimacy, but it is telling that the page ends with key deliverables for three groups: policymakers, journalists and funders (Bloomberg noted back in December that "It is in discussions around securing funding with philanthropic organizations and high-net-worth individuals"). Again, this is pragmatic, but it highlights the constraints of the sector: the need for money and the necessity of keeping the media supplied with "Clear analysis you can quote" (sic).

Verdant's first report - Waste Not: How the UK government can save money and support public services - further highlights the constraints of the genre. It was "developed with input from a short discussion with 10 varied members of the public from across England who had previously taken part in citizens’ assemblies and juries organised by Shared Future". You can either see this as dependence on the focus group method, which is well-known for being steered to provide predetermined conclusions (consider the Labour Party's investment in the construction of its "hero voter" by Deborah Mattinson et al and the reality of a shrinking electoral bloc), or as evidence of a real commitment to inclusion and dialogue. What I would emphasise is that the report thus appears to be generated out of rational debate, like a perfect example of Habermasian communicative reason, even though it frankly admits to using this simply as a filter for prepared ideas (not many voters will be au fait with the lessons learned from the Government Digital Service). 

What is missing here is the diagnosis that informs the prognosis. While some think tanks happily provide this within limits, e.g. the structural failings of a specific industry or public service that justifies "reform", there is an avoidance of systemic critique, e.g. why does capitalism produce poverty? You're not going to get a regular hearing in the Guardian, let alone Bloomberg, if you do that. The report does provide context for its proposals on how to reduce waste and save costs by focusing on how not to do it, specifically the self-harm of austerity and the vandalism of DOGE (amusingly, Heather Stewart's report in the Guardian mentioned the latter four times but the former not once). But this serves to obscure the gap in the analysis of its chosen areas. For example, why is defence procurement "broken" and "notoriously wasteful"? The answer surely has as much to do with defence strategy and priorities (those pointless aircraft carriers) as it does with poor government process and industry graft.

The proposal for a Chief Savings Officer, borrowed from Zohran Mandami's fledgling administration in New York, is obviously an example of corporate-speak infesting the public realm, but it is also an example of the idea that the machinery of government can be galvanised by appointing another mover and shaker with corporate nous. Given the long line of "Tsars" and "champions" appointed by the government over the years, you'd think some scepticism might be in order (on a more positive note, the report does urge a "word of caution" on the ignorant technophilia of Peter Kyle in respect of the state's adoption of AI, which rhetorically followed the template of Tony Blair's embrace of globalisation twenty years ago and has clearly learned nothing from history). The report does pay tribute to the value of tacit (i.e. shopfloor) knowledge in its proposal for an inhouse management consultancy, but it is couched in the terms of pull ("bringing it into the management consultancy and generalising the lessons learned") rather than push (worker autonomy).

Despite the growing tendency of the rightwing and centrist press to paint the Greens as loony lefties, now apparently infested with cranks and antisemites, it is clear that the party's strategy isn't to push leftwards so much as to occupy the centre-left space vacated by Labour as the latter attempts to dominate the centre-right in place of the Conservatives. This means there will be a certain amount of singing the old songs of social democracy, from nationalisation to more progressive taxation, and a lot of appeals to the mythos of the "soft left" (the relative popularity of Ed Miliband's green turn has benefited the Greens far more than Labour), but more radical proposals around wealth distribution, industrial democracy and foreign relations will probably be marginalised in order to keep the bond markets on-side. Zack Polanski has personal and political capital sufficient to argue for a more Spain-like posture in relation to the US and Israel, and to advocate de-proscribing Palestine Action, but he isn't going to be implementing BDS across government or closing airfields to US planes.

What will be interesting as we approach the next general election is the extent to which Verdant pushes the envelope of the possible in relation to Green policy beyond the crowd-pleasing vibes that distinguished its Gorton and Denton by-election victory. Its first report is a positive sign that it hopes to smuggle in some more radical ideas under cover of the think tank genre. The idea that only the government can secure public spending savings through better control of procurement and outsourcing is radical insofar as it challenges the neoliberal consensus about private sector efficiency and the wisdom of markets. Personalising this in the role of a Chief Savings Officer is forgiveable. Likewise, developing management expertise within the state is a recognition that public services have unique needs in terms of coordination and control that do not map well onto private sector models. Institutionalising this as inhouse consultancy or a centre of excellence is, again, forgiveable. 

There are plenty of opportunities to educate the public on the merits of collective ownership, particularly in respect of environmental protection, and ample (and topical) examples of the supply-chain vulnerabilities caused by globalisation that can only be mitigated by the state. What remains less certain is whether the electorate understands that reducing (let alone reversing) climate change can only be achieved by forswearing the traditional model of economic growth, and that this inevitably entails either the systematic redistribution of wealth, both intra and inter-nationally, or a war of all against all. The tension at the heart of green politics is between the competing demands and attractions of the local and the global. The phrase "Think globally, act locally" is actually an avoidance of that truth in that it neatly segregates them into parallel zones. 

Verdant's first report focuses on the local, albeit at a national scale befitting a think tank that needs to attract the national media. What will be interesting is whether it will broaden the horizon of British voters in future - highlighting the connections between settler violence in the West Bank and low pay in Blackpool, for example, not just the linkage between the Straits of Hormuz and the price of food - or whether it will keep to the comfort zone of domestic policy. Arguably, it was the failure to expand postwar public education to the international stage - a result of the UK wishing to whitewash its colonial history - that ultimately undermined British social democracy by reducing policy to a series of domestic zero-sum struggles: the fiscal (taxpayers versus claimants), the industrial (the unions versus consumers), and the social (sectional interests, aka identity politics, versus the imagined community of the nation). If I have a concern about Verdant it isn't the reliance on corporate-speak but the fear that marginalising the international dimension may go beyond tactical prudence.

Twofer

The signs that the Green Party was on course to win the Gorton and Denton parliamentary by-election had been obvious for weeks. These included the desperation and negativity of Labour's campaign, which quickly identified the Greens as the real threat to its incumbency; Matt Goodwin's determination to use his media platform to demonise a sizeable chunk of the local electorate, a policy now adopted by the impeccably centrist Democracy Volunteers, despite their claims of Muslim "family voting" being dismissed by the returning officer; and the utter irrelevance of the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats. But perhaps the most telling was the sheer volume of reported "dirty tricks". This went beyond the traditional bar-chart abuse of opinion polling data by the Lib Dems ("winning here") to include obvious astroturf organisations, such as the Tactical Choice outfit claiming that only Labour could stop Reform, and the "concerned neighbour" letter posted out by Farage's crew early in the campaign without any party identification. 

The last of these was interesting because of its focus on the cost of living and its disappointment in Keir Starmer's government, two issues that the Greens also focused on but which were largely drowned in the media coverage of the final weeks with the emphasis instead being on who would be best placed to "stop Farage" or whether Farage was unstoppable. The letter included the time-honoured reference to how "Britain no longer feels like the country I grew up in", and sideswipes at the Greens for having "extreme policies like legalising drugs and letting men use women's changing rooms", but notable by its absence was any reference to immigration or Muslims. Goodwin's repeated references to "open borders", "Gaza" (in pejorative terms) and now "sectarianism" highlighted that what he was fighting for was not the Commons seat of a constituency with a significant non-white population but the further expansion of his media profile from GB News to the mainstream of BBC and ITV. 

The result last night is fairly easy to parse in terms of the vote. The first point to note is that turnout, at 47.6%, was only fractionally down on the 2024 general election figure of 48%, but that this was a considerable drop from the 61.7% in 2019. By-election turnout is normally lower than for general elections, with the spread typically being around 20%. Yesterday's figure emphasises both the depressed turnout at the last general election and the fact that as a safe seat Gorton and Denton would normally track below the national turnout (by 5.6% in 2019). In other words, you might have expected turnout this time to be closer to 30% if it were seen as a continuation of 2024, but nearer 45% if it were seen as a continuation of 2019. One interpretation of this is that the popular appetite for electoral democracy that appeared to wane at the last general election has returned but the traditional parties are not going to be the beneficiaries of it.

The second point to make is that Labour's vote has plummeted, but that this didn't happen overnight, and it may not even have hit bottom yet. The trajectory is clear: 30,814 in 2019, 18,555 in 2024, and now 9,364  in 2026. Surely the McSweeneyite myth of "efficient vote distribution" in 2024 has finally run out of road. The Greens have jumped by roughly 10k votes from a base of 5k. Allowing for the usual caveats about voter rotation, 3k of that has probably come from the Worker's Party, which didn't stand this time round, which means 7k shifted over from Labour. Reform went from 5k to 10k. If we assume they gained 2k Tory voters (down from 3k to under 1k), then they gained 3k from Labour. Thus the governing party lost 10k voters: over 2/3rds to its left flank and just under 1/3rd to its right flank. The worry for Labour is that the extra 11k of voters who could be expected to turn out at a general election (i.e. assuming a 62% turnout) aren't obviously enthused by the prospect of another Labour government, whether led by Keir Starmer or anyone else, otherwise they would have turned out in 2024.

Despite the clear evidence that Labour lost mainly to the left, not to the right, there is no immediate sign that it will acknowledge this asymmetry let alone adjust its policy platform and electoral strategy accordingly. Keir Starmer is instead talking about Labour as the only party that can unite the country between the extremes of left and right. There was an implicit acknowledgment in Labour's focus on demonising the Greens as drug-pushers, but this appears to have simply alienated progressive voters, many of whom clearly have a more sophisticated understanding of drug-use and the advantages of a health-based approach to minimising it than the government front bench. It also made Labour sound too much like Reform, which once again reinforces the point that it is trying to attract voters who will never vote for it while repelling voters who traditionally did vote for it.

The great "what if" of post-count analysis has been Labour's decision to block Andy Burnham from standing for selection as the party's candidate. This has been attributed to Starmer's insecurity and jealousy. The personal dimension probably played a part, but the theory ignores that it was the party right, long-versed under Mandelson and his protégé McSweeney in rigging selections, that did the blocking via the NEC. It also ignores that Burnham wouldn't necessarily have won the selection contest, given the right's grip on the local party and his identification with the "soft left". The chosen candidate, Angeliki Stogia, works for the construction group Arup, which has created conflicts of interest in her role as a councillor because of the number of contracts they have with Manchester City Council. No one in the party appears to have wondered whether selecting someone who is essentially a corporate lobbyist was a smart move. All that mattered was that she was on the right of the party.

It's also not a gimme that Burnham would have won. A smarter politician than Starmer might have cleared the way for him to stand. A victory, however narrow, would have reflected well on the whole government and Burnham in Westminster would have been inside the tent pissing out instead of outside the tent pissing in. His history suggests he would happily have fallen into line, once given a ministerial brief, and he would have provided a counterweight to Wes Streeting more than an active challenge to the Prime Minister. If Burnham had lost the by-election, his political career would be dust and he would no longer be a threat to Starmer or anyone else. Meanwhile, Stogia or some other indentikit managerialist drone from the ranks of Labour councillors could have been put forward to the Mayoralty. Labour's miscalculation means that the Greens will now be hoping to make similar scale gains in the local elections in May.

In the final analysis, the Greens were nailed on to win the Gorton and Denton by-election because they offered a twofer for a plurality of voters: you could thwart Nigel Farage and simultaneously stick two fingers up to Keir Starmer. This appealed to left-wing voters looking for a protest vehicle, progressive voters disappointed by the government's behaviour over benefits and Gaza, and even some conservative voters disgusted by Reform and Labour's shared intolerance. Some will blame Starmer's performance as Prime Minister for Labour's defeat, but the reality is that voters had already made a damning judgement on him in 2024 when only 1 in 3 could be bothered to vote for the only party capable of getting the Tories out of office. Likewise, Reform's backers will insist on Gorton and Denton's atypicality - i.e. Muslim presence - while ignoring that even with the advantage of a Tory collapse they still couldn't muster 1 in 3 votes. 30% appears to be their ceiling in the opinion polls and the suspicion is that in the next general election they'll struggle to get much more than 20%. In contrast, the Green Party has shown that it has a much heigher ceiling.