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Friday, 29 August 2025

Liberal Preferences

Chris Dillow, building on a post by David Allen Green, notes that UK politics is in crisis because "destabilizing forces have strengthened and stabilizing ones have weakened." What he means by this is that the tendency to rein in the extremes is no longer instinctive among the main parties (obviously stamping on herbivorous lefties is another matter). He gives a good example in the relative treatment of Enoch Powell after his Rivers of Blood speech (sacked by party leader Ted Heath) and Robert Jenrick after thoughtlessly hobnobbing with Fascist activists (not a hint of disciplinary action from Kemi Badenoch). Instead of negative feedback, we get positive feedback as bigotry is mainstreamed, urban myths are cast as legitimate concerns, and someone who incited racial hatred and advocated burning people to death is hailed as a political prisoner. Elsewhere, economic illiteracy is promoted by both politicians and the media because they believe the electorate is ignorant and can only be appealed to through crass simplifications such as the nation's "maxed-out credit card".

As Chris explains, "All I'm doing here is spelling out a few mechanisms in support of David Allen Green's recent attack on the complacent idea that 'unpleasant situations will resolve themselves' and that balance will be restored. For this to happen, there must be negative, stabilizing, feedback mechanisms. But our political-media class has weakened these, preferring to pander to racism. I'm not surprised that so many in this class choose barbarism over socialism. What is surprising is that they choose barbarism even over liberal democracy." So why do they make that latter choice? One place to seek an answer is the house journal of British liberalism, The Guardian. I would argue that its most typical columnist is John Harris, who can be characterised as a liberal pessimist in that he regularly chides "progressives" for not doing enough to resist racism or improve public services, but whose only solution is vapid symbolism and otherwise cultivating your garden. There are others who are more optimistic (Polly Toynbee) and more pessimistic (Rafael Behr), but Harris is representative because he tends to sway between those poles, like a depressed ruminant who spots a buttercup.

He certainly wasn't an advocate of Labour's shift to a more genuinely progressive politics under Jeremy Corbyn, though his attempts to parse the upswell of enthusiasm that gave rise to it between 2015 and 2019 are interesting precisely because of his need to welcome that progressive intent while dismissing the left as a viable vehicle for it. Thus during the leadership contest in 2015 he welcomed that Corbyn offered clarity, but by the time the 2017 general election came into view, he was dismissing a Corbyn-led Labour Party as deeply irrelevant. Immediately after the unexpectedly positive result for Labour, Corbyn was apparently chiming with the times. By 2019 Harris was fully on board with the hunt for antisemites, insisting that Labour's only hope was to ditch its fringe views and toxic culture, and even adopt his favoured panacea of localism for good measure (nothing fringe about that). Viewed rapidly like a flip book, what we see is a liberal, keen to avoid the charge of being an out-of-touch curmudgeon, frightened by the prospect of a government promising mild social democracy.


In his latest contribution to the discourse, Harris claims that while the far-right protests outside hotels housing asylum-seekers have been damp squibs, progressive forces are "so dumbfounded and confused by what is happening that they seem almost completely unable to respond". What he fails to acknowledge is that the left is not silent, it is merely marginalised by the media (the larger counter-demonstrations have been barely reported, and when they do appear in the Guardian it's as likely to be an opportunity for tone-policing). The real culprit here is the Labour government, which has provided rhetorical cover for street-level racism while simultaneously curtailing the rights of protest by anti-racists. And it is the media that explains how protests with minimal support on the street beyond the old Fascist right can dominate politics. Indeed, if you're looking for a "new right" you should start with the increasing derangement of newspaper columnists like Allison Pearson and Melanie Phillips, not with the latest neo-Nazi groupuscule to emerge from under a rock.

Harris's prescription in the face of an increasingly Fascist press, and a complacently centrist TV insisting on impartiality between truth and lies, is nostalgia, and specifically the symbolic power of Rock Against Racism. What he doesn't appreciate is that RAR and the Anti-Nazi League reflected a wider revolt against the political establishment in the late-70s and early-80s that notably roiled the Labour Party. What Harris wants is the free concerts, not Tony Benn bidding for the Deputy Leadership or Ken Livingstone defying the Thatcher government. His claim that "The prominence of Palestine flags at this year’s festivals proves that music’s radical edges have not been completely blunted" is an admission that he sees this radicalism (of the music note, not the people) as purely symbolic, otherwise he might wonder whether there was any connection between opposing genocidal racism abroad and defending migrants at home.

Chris Dillow's model of stablisation through negative feedback depends on authority. When Ted Heath sacked Enoch Powell he not only had the authority of his position as Conservative Party Leader, he was also the representative of an establishment that still commanded popular respect, despite the downward trend since the Suez crisis, not least because of its eventual resistance to Nazism (Heath himself had opposed appeasement in the 1930s). The establishment has lost a lot more respect since the 1980s, due to the secular failure of its preferred economic policies, the decay of the public realm, and because of specific scandals of trust, from Iraq to MPs' expenses. As the establishment's man, Keir Starmer has clearly failed in his goal of restoring the authority and gravitas of government after a decade and a half of disastrous Tory rule. Yet his political strategy, to occupy the centre-right of politics and marginalise both the far-right and the left, remains unchanged, largely because the Conservative Party has fallen apart in the face of Reform's rise, leaving the ground clear to Labour. He has the field, but the battle may already be lost.


Starmer's problem is that his centre-right offer acts as positive feedback to Reform, which encourages right-leaning voters to go for the full-fat version, while it alienates both centrists and soi disant progressives like John Harris because it fails to reflect their self-image as rational and virtuous. Who can provide the negative feedback to arrest the rightward drift of politics in such an environment? Harris may posture about that drift, but he has played his own part in it. Consider this classic of the legitimate concerns genre from a couple of weeks ago: "Just to be clear, the grim scenes that have materialised at those hotels are the signs not just of far-right activism and provocation, but broken policy. No one should underestimate how much the grooming gangs scandal has given many people a deep fear about the safety of women and girls, not least in places that have long felt ignored and neglected". The roots of the grooming scandal lay in the habitual contempt shown by the police and social services to working-class girls, not in the shortcomings of asylum policy.

The problem then is that liberals are not defending liberal democracy and are happy to accept the right's framing of social ills. One way of explaining this is to note that centrists, the largest component of the British politico-media class, aren't actually liberals, neither in the broader sense of defenders of civil liberties against authoritarianism, nor in the narrower sense of advocates of free markets (their's is a capitalism of managed markets and corporate graft). That broader sense is still prevalent in British society, but it has no real political articulation at present, and its more vigorous proponents regularly find themselves marginalised as extremists by the media and even criminalised by the state. At this point we have to ask if the UK is actually a liberal democracy in any meaningful sense. The classic definitions of the term usually focus on the mechanics: fair elections, an independent judiciary, the separation of powers etc. But the acid test is arguably equal protection under the law. This is, for example, why Israel cannot be considered a liberal democracy. 

In the UK we have not gone so far as to pass a basic law that guarantees superior rights for certain groups, and thus inferior rights for others, but that may well be on the cards should Reform get into government and withdraw us from the European Convention on Human Rights (both the government and media are already assessing Farage's mass-deportation promise in terms of achieavability rather than morality or civil rights). But this won't be a sudden lurch away from liberal democracy. The current government's unwillingness to secure the rights of trans people, and its proscription of Palestine Action on the flimsiest of pretexts, are clear indicators of the direction of travel. And before that, we can see a common thread of contempt for those who resist the politico-media consensus running backwards through the Labour antisemitism nonsense, via Brexit and the dismissal of the Iraq War protests, all the way to Thatcherism. British centrists chose barbarism over liberal democracy a long time ago.

Sunday, 24 August 2025

A Taxing Issue

The United Kingdom is richer today than it has ever been, both in the material sense of stuff (the conversion of natural resources into useful things) and in the accounting sense of the ratio of measurable wealth to GDP. It is estimated that household wealth is now six times GDP, having risen from four times before the millennium. There has been a clear trend since 1980 of rising household wealth, to a large extent property and to a lesser extent financial assets (shares, savings etc). This rise has mainly been passive - i.e. the result of rising property and asset prices rather than any increase in direct productivity or trade. Average household density is actually in decline. Together with rising rents and mortgage costs, this means that "housing services" now cost much more, even allowing for inflation. Meanwhile, houses and flats are exportable only in the sense that a foreigner can buy one, but this does not lead to the production of more houses over-and-above domestic demand, because those properties are typically recirculated into the rental market. 

It is generally accepted among economists that we should tax wealth more than income, essentially because the one is potentially inactive (if not invested in productive use) while the other is invariably active (you must be producing value to command a wage). In other words, wealth may be a wasted opportunity and tax is a way of incentivising its productive use. The problem arises because wealth is also a way of building financial reserves for future use, whether in the form of anticipated capital projects or a fund for future expenditure. This is why we give tax-breaks for certain types of saving as well as for investment. The problem that bedevils the discussion of the taxation of property is the extent to which it represents a simple store of value, like gold, versus a savings account. In other words, is your house (in whole or in part) a luxury good or is it your pension? 

The foundation of popular neoliberalism has been the financialisation of both domestic property and precautionary savings. The first has meant treating your home as an investment in the hope of rising property values, which has inexorably led to a political consensus that has constrained housebuilding while loudly claiming to be in favour of more homes. The second has meant excising the role of the state in providing collective insurance, instead relying on the individual negotiating with impersonal markets, which at the margin leads to an appetite for high-risk/high-reward shortcuts such as crypto. The two intersect in the idea that your house - or your other house if you're a buy-to-let landlord - is also your pension, though one of the things declining household density tells us is that many older couples, notably those who secured defined benefits pensions before the shutters came down in the 1990s, are in no hurry to liquidate their prime asset and downsize.


Despite this massive increase in the nation's wealth, we are repeatedly told that the current Chancellor of the Exchequer is "desperate to find money". Because of the government's promise not to increase income tax (perhaps the only promise it will keep over the life of the parliament), attention has turned to the taxation of wealth, first through inheritance and now through property. The candidate mechanisms being discussed include the replacement of Stamp Duty Land Tax (SDLT) with an annual levy proportionate to value and the extension of capital gains tax (CGT) to the sale of higher value properties. Inevitably, there is also talk of finally fixing council tax, whether by folding it into the annual levy or simply revaluing the existing property bands to address the current inequities. Many of these ideas have emerged from the centre-right of the political spectrum where there is clearly anxiety that without reform more radical measures may become popular (a land value tax, equalising CGT with income tax etc). But unpicking the Thatcherite dispensation takes delicacy, because of the intersection of property and savings.

Tim Leunig of the think-tank Onward is one of the leading lights of this tendency, proposing a "horizontal split" between local and central government tax receipts. The former would be funded by a local tax based on property values up to a maximum of £500,000 - i.e. a house worth £1 million would be assessed for tax as £0.5 million. Owners (not residents) of properties over that value would additionally pay a national annual levy based on the most recent sale price, the receipts of which would go to central government. This would be immediately advantageous to owners of high-value properties in terms of a lower local tax. In theory, that gain is more that wiped out by the national tax, but that depends on when the property was last sold, leading Leunig to propose a further supplement to balance the tax burden in the case of properties not sold (e.g. repeatedly inherited). At this point it becomes obvious that there are too many potential loopholes, and too much reliance on adjustment by HMRC, which creates opportunities for the tax advisors of the wealthy to exploit.

Leaving aside its chances of adoption, the notable feature of Leunig's scheme is its crude division of society by wealth into two classes. His attempt to justify this by splitting the receipts between local and central government is hardly convincing given that the latter still has to fund the former through grants: no local authority is wholly self-financing. The Thatcherite dream of full accountability to local taxpayers, which drove the Poll Tax, was always in tension with the desire to emasculate ideologically hostile councils through Whitehall diktat. The fundamental problem for our society remains the anticipated decline of income tax receipts as a share of government revenue due to demographic change: more elderly and fewer working-age people in the population. The secular growth in wealth, and the potential to tax it, offers the only real solution to address this trend as further taxes on consumption (e.g. VAT, fuel duty etc.) would be inflationary and hugely unpopular. Worrying about the division of receipts between local and central government is a distraction.


Others have taken a more overtly divisive tack. For example, Phillip Inman in the Guardian sees it in generational terms as the boomers versus the rest. That many boomers are not wealthy, while some millennials are (often due to inheritance), does not lead him to qualify the explicit threat: "If boomers cannot bring themselves to act collectively and patriotically for the greater good, as seems unlikely for many reasons, then it will be legitimate for the government to pursue their lottery winnings with higher property and pension taxes." This is unhelpful because it personalises the issue of wealth ("lottery winners"), though it should be said that Inman's critics fall into the same trap in talking about virtue. The reality is that boomers were simply those in residence when the financialisation of property and pensions took off: some benefited, some didn't. That unearned wealth will now pass down the generations. To address that inequity means addressing the wealth, not blaming the individual.

Wealth can be divided into two classes: land and money. The former is easy to tax because it is immobile and relatively straightforward to value. The latter takes two forms: accumulated money (e.g. a bank deposit) and transacted money (e.g. a payment or a receipt). Accumulated money is difficult to tax because it can be hidden or offshored. Transacted money is relatively easy to tax at the point of the transaction, hence our reliance on VAT, PAYE, CGT, SDLT etc. The problem with this is not the levying of tax but the rates chosen. For example, we levy higher rates on earned income (income tax) than we do on unearned income (CGT or dividends). The rationale for this differential is to avoid discouraging transactions, but that makes little sense in the real world. The reason we don't put VAT on food is not because we think doing so would lead to everyone dieting. Likewise, investors who rely on capital gains to provide an income aren't going to sell up and take jobs instead. After all, who would they sell to?

The obvious solutions to the Chancellor's problem are a land value tax (LVT) and the extension of income tax to all unearned income, e.g. capital gains, dividends and inheritance. The first would give us a more efficient tax system: receipts would be predictable (SDLT is not); avoidance minimal (assuming the government doesn't grant exemptions); and the tax itself progressive (on the reasonable assumption that there is a correlation between land ownership and wealth). The second would also have the advantage of simplicity; would discourage avoidance (e.g. individuals masquerading as a company to treat wages as a dividend); and would also be progressive (the people who make capital gains and earn dividends tend to be wealthier). Neither has any realistic chance of being adopted, precisely because they would shift more of the burden of tax onto the truly wealthy. The most realistic outcome at present remains a revaluation of council tax as this would spread the pain across most of society. We remain trapped in Thatcher's legacy, despite the obvious failures of popular neoliberalism.

Saturday, 16 August 2025

Conservative Pessimism

In last Monday's Guardian you could read both John Harris describing his dismay at the right's "ballooning narrative about complete social breakdown" and Nesrine Malik noting that the call for the deportation of immigrants has become mainstream. Harris inevitably felt the need to drag in the left as a pointless comparison: "Just as people on the left have been predicting for at least 150 years that capitalism is about to chaotically implode under the weight of its own contradictions, so some of the loudest voices on the post-Brexit right have come up with their own version of a similarly historic meltdown: a vision of the immediate future in which rampant wokery, crime, failed immigration policy, weak policing and general establishment decay and corruption will lead inexorably to what Nigel Farage calls 'societal collapse'." Leaving aside the crude strawman, not to mention the plentiful evidence that capitalism is trashing the planet, the point to note here is Harris's belief that this is a new development on the right, with the none-too subtle hint that the left remains trapped in the past so we shouldn't look for any answers there.

Similarly, the normally acute Malik falls into the trap of assuming that the calls for mass deportation are novel. She is correct that this language has been amplified by politicians in recent years, notably by Keir Starmer, but she is mistaken in claiming that "the last time a member of a political party even hinted at any sort of deportation policy was in the late 00s, when British National party leader Nick Griffin ... stated that he would 'encourage' voluntary repatriation of legal migrants and 'those of foreign descent to return to their lands of ethnic origin'." There been plenty of hints in the interevening period. After all, what do you imagine most people think when they hear the phrase "one in, one out"? And repatriation was never limited to the neo-Nazis, as Enoch Powell's many supporters proved. In fact, both ideas - that society is coming apart at the seams and that immigrants should be "sent back" - have been common among Tories since the 1960s when the Monday Club was founded. The views may not have been considered respectable by many Conservative grandees, but they were common among the rank and file. Margaret Thatcher's victory in 1979 owed much to both: the belief that the country was falling apart during the "Winter of Discontent" and the perception that immigration left many people feeling, as she put it, "swamped".

Going further back, in 1945 Winston Churchill infamously predicted that a Labour victory under Clement Attlee would lead to the creation of a British Gestapo. This wasn't a lunatic exaggeration fuelled by too much champagne but simply the continuation of pre-war practice. Between 1919 and 1924 the Conservative Party defined itself primarily around the anti-Bolshevik "Red Scare", culminating in the notorious Zinoviev letter, a forgery published by the Daily Mail to (successfully) damage Labour's chances in the general election. The mainstream right have always been hysterical when out of power, or facing that prospect, and the form this takes is invariably hyperbolic warnings about threats to our way of life emanating from a coalition of foreigners, traitors and idiot do-gooders. In its contemporary guise, Bolsheviks and sandal-wearing vegetarians have been replaced by rapacious asylum-seekers and trans rights activists. There's nothing novel in anything that either Nigel Farage or Robert Jenrick has said lately, though there is an important difference in their manner of delivery.


Pessimism is the natural tenor of conservative thought. The roots of the right's philosophy lie in the Hobbesian vision of a war of all against all, not in Edmund Burke or Michael Oakeshott's eulogisation of the small platoons and the familiar. Burke was actually a stinging critic of the Ancien Regime, along with Joseph de Maistre, precisely because he feared it lacked the rectitude and courage to defeat revolution from below. It is fear that is central to conservatism, and that fear routinely manifests as a belief that the country is going to the dogs and that we are being invaded by grasping foreigners. In this context it's worth noting that revolution from above, in the sense of the elite restoration of tradition in the face of such threats, is not only countenanced but seen as exemplary: hence the eulogisation of the Glorious Revolution of 1688, which apparently saved the country from absolute monarchy, Catholicism and foreign fashions. 

In contrast, the common thread that runs through the political philosophy of the broad left, from incremental liberals to ecstatic insurrectionaries, is optimism: the belief that things can get better and that politics can effect change. Even John Harris's crude caricature of the Marxist left gets this right: the certainty that there will be another crisis and thus another chance for progress. One way of thinking about Labour's current troubles is that despite expelling most of the left, the PLP remains divided between the optimists - e.g. Blairites insisting that AI will solve all our problems - and the pessimists - the authoritarians insisting that if we don't stamp down hard on little old ladies with cardboard signs Vladimir Putin will be strolling up the Mall tomorrow. Starmer is clearly in the latter camp. His fundamental mistake is the failure to understand that the "conservative" voters he is trying to attract are motivated by optimism as much as pessimism, hence the talk of hard choices and the need for crackdowns has failed to win them over.

Michael Oakeshott's famous quote reflects the instinctive pessimism of the Tory elite: "To be conservative, then, is to prefer the familiar to the unknown, to prefer the tried to the untried, fact to mystery, the actual to the possible, the limited to the unbounded, the near to the distant, the sufficient to the superabundant, the convenient to the perfect, present laughter to utopian bliss." But success in democratic politics requires a mix of optimism and pessimism. Since 2016, voters in Britain have, perhaps paradoxically, tended towards optimism: displaying an appetite for the unknown and untried that led first to Jeremy Corbyn's ascent and then to Boris Johnson's victory in 2019. While Nigel Farage may currently lay on the horror stories of national decline with a trowel, it is his cheerful optimism that garners support for the mystery that is Reform, and it is Starmer's ingrained pessimism that means Labour's hopes of attracting conservative voters, or even retaining left-leaning ones, will likely continue to be frustrated.

Saturday, 9 August 2025

The Zone of Uninterest

Corey Robin recently published a post about how opinions on Israel are rapidly changing among Jews. It is heavily ironised, and stands at the intersection of the literary traditions of awakening conscience and the Jewish-American experience (his own style owes not a little to Philip Roth), but the essential point I'd like to focus on is his recognition of that rapidity: the sense that there has been a sea-change in opinion and understanding. He quotes a number of statements by prominent Jews, introducing them as follows: "I’m posting these statements here just to give you a sense of how quickly opinion is changing. And it’s not Israel-haters and antisemites or self-hating Jews who are voicing the alarm. Most of these individuals below continue to identify as Zionists, as liberal Zionists, and of those who no longer identify as Zionist, they come by their positions honestly, as I hope you will see."

What changed in recent weeks was the incontrovertible evidence that the Israeli government is engaged in a deliberate policy of starvation, with some members of the cabinet openly advocating the ethnic cleansing of Gaza, an intent reinforced by Benjamin Netanyahu's current proposal for the IDF to occupy the entire territory for an indeterminate period of time. What changed was the IDF murdering Palestinians queuing for food in what can only be described as a killing field. The decision of a number of Western countries to signal their intent to recognise a Palestinian state next month, along with the long-overdue and still tentative steps towards an arms embargo by the likes of Germany, have been symptomatic of this wider sea-change, rather than contributory factors. They are evidence of the realisation of governments that have willingly supported Israel that they are way out of line with their own electorates, and are increasingly out of line with liberal Jewish opinion globally.

Many of the people cited by Robin discuss the issue in terms of crossing a line: that Israel has gone too far, and risks losing its soul in the process. Perhaps the most interesting citation is of Avrum Burg, a former interim President of Israel and Leader of the Knesset who is prepared, at least rhetorically, to address the more existential issue - essentially the entire history of the state since 1948 - but who frames this in terms of Israeli/Jewish loss: "Could it be that the current State of Israel, that its body stronger than ever and its spirit deader than ever, no longer deserves to exist? Not because of what happened on October 7, but because of everything that came before, and everything that has erupted since….The destruction of Gaza is a damning indictment of Israel’s moral bankruptcy. And we must face the truth: Israel without an ethical foundation has no justification to exist."

There is a well-worn trope in the literary treatment of Nazism and the Holocaust of the cultured German officer listening to Schubert after a hard day's work overseeing the gas ovens. Beyond the inherent class bias in this image, which assumes the ordinary German soldier was an unthinking brute in comparison, there is this idea of loss: how could a culture that produced Schubert lead to the Final Solution? Where did Germany's soul go? The problem with the "crossing a line" framing is that it suggests a step back could be taken across that same line, like the German officer coming to his senses as he listens to Erlkönig, feeling pity for his victims and understanding that he is the evil-doer. But that is obviously absurd. While some Germans bravely resisted the Nazis, most did not, and those officers in the camps were selected precisely because they were true-believers who would feel neither shame nor guilt. 


In Eichmann in Jerusalem, Hannah Arendt (another writer Robin has long engaged with) famously wrote of "the banality of evil". The book caused a furore (and continues to divide historians) both because it described Eichman primarily as a careerist rather than a fervid antisemite, and because it highlighted the complicity of some Jews in the facilitation of the Holocaust. The first charge is problematic because it suggests Eichmann's behaviour was the result of incentives, rather than any commitment on his part over-and-above career advancement. At the close of Jonathan Glazer's 2023 film The Zone of Interest we see the Auschwitz camp commandant Rudolf Höss retching as he descends the stairs of a deserted palace into the darkness. Is this his conscience rebelling? In reality Höss claimed to have realised the enormity of his crimes only days before his execution. Prior to that, his attitude when challenged was described as "apathetic" and having "a lack of empathy". I can't be the only one who saw a parallel between the film's scenes of mundane looting and videos of IDF soldiers cavorting with children's toys and women's underwear in the ruins of Gaza.

Western governments have gone out of their way not merely to support Israel's military actions but to provide it with every possible excuse to step back over the line: to be applauded for restoring a status quo ante bellum in which Gaza was already a concentration camp, blockaded and rationed to punish the Palestinians as a people. Keir Starmer's pompous conditionality is simply a route that Netanyahu can take, with minimal inconvenience, to ensure that the recognition of Palestinian statehood is once more deferred and Israel reaffirmed in the community of the Western powers. In reality, the momentum of events and the wider anger in Europe may see the UK isolated in September, perhaps only lining up alongside Germany, a country whose Staatsräson requires that it expiate its guilt over the Holocaust by giving Israel carte blanche (the embargo on arms that "could be used in Gaza" is obviously little more than a gesture).

But is it possible to step back over that line? It clearly wasn't in the case of Eichmann and Höss. You can't simply say "Sorry, we went too far" after committing a deliberate genocide. Robin quotes the academic Lihi Ben Shitrit: "As psychologists note, shame and guilt are similar and often appear together, but there are crucial differences. Feeling shame is associated with embarrassment over the actions of members of our group that we think negatively reflect on our group’s identity. Guilt occurs when we feel collective responsibility for the negative actions of our group members. Shame leads to avoidance — hiding, denying or looking away from such actions. Guilt, on the other hand, motivates reparative or restorative responses. Liberal Jews like myself need to overcome our shame, which pushes some of us to avoid or even deny the reality of Gaza. Instead, we must grapple with guilt; guilt not in the sense of personal culpability, but rather in our collective responsibility."

Jonathan Freedland in the Guardian provides an object example of that liberal avoidance, even going so far as to claim a "moral case for escapism", and thus superior virtue: "For it’s when we feel ourselves plunged into the abyss, when our despair at our fellow human beings pulls strongest, that we most need to look upward – and glimpse the stars." What Freedland is implicitly saying is that his shame will never become guilt, in Ben Shitrit's terms. In other words he will neither question the existence of the State of Israel, like Avrum Burg, nor concede that collective responsibility means that Western governments, complacement liberal media and Israeli society generally must be deemed as guilty as Netanyahu, Smotrich and Gvir. As with the reaction to Eichmann in Jerusalem, it is that second charge, of collective responsibility, that sticks in his craw.

Saturday, 2 August 2025

Conditionality

The two-state solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict remains a polite fiction, urged mostly by European governments that have no intention of taking active steps to implement it. The US long ago gave up on even the fiction, preferring to make clear its support for a maximalist policy by Israel. The decision to bomb Iran in June was an endorsement of its client state's insistence that its area of authority is all of the Middle East, with only Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states (currently) off-limits. So long as Israel remains America's regional proxy, which it will do regardless of who is in the White House, there is no possibility of its territorial integrity being called into question by a land-for-peace deal with the Palestinians. That the fiction of the two-state solution is once more in the news does not indicate some tectonic shift in the geopolitical plates, despite the breathless coverage in the media. The proposed recognition of a Palestinian state in September by France, the UK and others is merely the latest attempt to preserve the fiction with the minimum of effort and consequence.

The conditions outlined by Keir Starmer are obviously intended to give himself sufficient room for manoeuvre to once more renege on a promise, even if Isarel truculently refuses to oblige by agreeing to even a temporary ceasefire. But they are also intended to revive the value of the "card" of formal recognition, and thus of the two-state solution itself, after years in which it has dwindled to almost nothing. To switch metaphors, by solemnly reviving the carrot as the centrepiece of his strategy he hopes to avoid questions over why the UK government has not thought fit to deploy the sticks of sanctions and arms embargoes in the face of what even centrist commentators are now admitting amounts to genocide. I have no idea whether Starmer will find himself obliged to recognise a Palestinian state in September, or whether he will find a way of wriggling out of it (the absurd conditions laid on Hamas - disband, have no future role etc - might well do the trick), but I do know that his decision will amount to little either way so long as the material and political support that the UK offers to Israel continues.

Patrick Wintour in the Guardian referred to the emerging division "between the moderate and extremist visions for the future of Gaza and the West Bank once the war finally ends." But he immediately emphasised that the former is premised on the Palestinians submitting to foreign interference - "a radically reformed Palestinian Authority governing without Hamas" - which makes clear that what will be recognised is closer to the pre-1948 British mandate than an independent people. Critics who insisted that the right of statehood cannot be qualified were forgetting that such qualifications were central to the operation of British imperialism during the twentieth century and it appears that muscle memory has kicked in, even though the UK simply doesn't have the power to impose its will in the way it did 100 years ago. This is why Starmer's conditions have a slightly ridiculous air of pomposity about them: I found myself hearing the voice of Neville Chamberlain talking about having sent the German Chancellor a "final note" as the current Prime Minister stood at the lectern. 


The conference in New York this week, hosted jointly by France and Saudi Arabia, employed similar language, insisting that "a transitional administrative committee must be immediately established to operate in Gaza under the umbrella of the Palestinian Authority". Given the corruption of the PA, this simply looks like a change of jailers for the people of Gaza and the West Bank. What is singularly lacking is any reference to the 1967 borders, which can be the only viable basis for a territorial settlement. According to Wintour, "The reality is that Israel in the wake of 7 October has moved further and further away from notions of a two-state solution." In fact, Israel had been steadily moving away from the idea since before the collapse of the Oslo Accords and the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin. Illegal settlements have been created with state support since 1967. Indeed, you could argue that the Accords lasting influence was to confirm that Israel had no interest in an equitable peace, seeing Palestine as "less than a state", in Rabin's words, and the Palestinian Authority as mere collaborators.

For Jonathan Freedland, the Guardian's chief apologist for Israel, the problem remains Netanyahu ("Steadily, the Israeli public is coming to see the price of the pariah status that Netanyahu has all but cultivated.") If world opinion has (reluctantly) concluded that Israel has crossed a line, there is no recognition by Freedland that the actions of the government are a faithful reflection of the society that elected it. But while he ignores the reality of Israel he is happy to recyle Number 10's crude interpretation of Hamas: "That group is not interested, they say, in a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza, living alongside Israel. Hamas is not in the two-state business, but rather seeks to rule over a single, jihadist state across the entire land, from the river to the sea." Freedland's understanding of the region, which accurately reflects British centrist opinion, is premised on the myth that most Israelis are liberal and secular, and that most Palestinians are religious fundamentalists who wish to wipe Israel off the map. It is this idea that informs the "moderate vision" that Wintour speaks of. 

Implicit in this vision are a number of assumptions: that the Palestinians must be actively policed to guarantee Israel's security (and not vice versa); that the Palestinian Authority must be answerable to Israel and the international community, rather than just the Palestinian people; and that Palestine must be "less than a state", lacking such accoutrements as an army or an independent foreign policy. It is a mindset that reflects the persistence of colonial thinking among Western governments in which certain peoples are deemed unfit for self-rule. Genocide never occurs out of the blue. It arises against a background narrative in which an entire "other" people is seen as a threat that must be expunged to guarantee the security of the nation. And in the context of Israel-Palestine, it is the "moderate" vision as much as the extremist that is responsible for that narrative. This was a genocide long-foretold because it is a narrative we have long been conditioned to.

Sunday, 27 July 2025

The Rage of the Centrist

The evidence that Israel is deliberately starving the Gazan population if not to death then to a state of extreme malnutrition that will scar it for generations is now irrefutable. This has led to some predictable hand-wringing by centrist commentators, such as Gaby Hinsliff demanding a more virtuous response from a UK government that has not only been complicit in Israel's genocidal war but has actively criminalised principled opposition to it. We are told that pressure is mounting on Starmer to recognise a Palestinian state, even though this would do nothing to alleviate the suffering. If Emmanuel Macron thinks it's a good idea, you can be confident it's an empty gesture. In reality, the UK government is never going to recognise a free Palestine, something that the cabinet ministers briefing the press about their support for it know perfectly well. They are trying to protect their career prospects, or at least avoid being sacked by the electors, by crying crocodile tears for starving children.

What is notable is not just the abject cowardice of the response by centrists like Hinsliff but their refusal to accept that the time has come for the UK government to take meaningful steps, such as an arms embargo or sanctions against Israel. This is not just a transparent attempt to obscure their failure to advocate a stronger line months ago, when the direction of travel was obvious. It also highlights their own commitment to what we really should start calling the final solution of the Palestinian problem. Just as the government will never recognise an independent Palestine, so the commentariat will never admit that the goal all along has been the erasure of the Palestinians as a people with a land. You might as well ask them to admit that the Labour Party wasn't riddled with antisemitism between 2016 and 2019, and wholly free of that bacillus before and after.

This refusal to face the reality of their choices creates a psychic burden that needs some form of release. To no one's great surprise, as the evidence of genocide and the strategic use of starvation has mounted, so the centrist hatred of the left has reached an even more hysterical pitch. While Paul Mason insists that the new party mooted by Jeremy Corbyn and Zarah Sultana would be the re-embodiment of the German Communist Party, paving the way for Hitler/Farage, Nick Tyrone, a self-styled centrist dad and think-tank wallah, opined that "literally anyone" would be better in government than the two former Labour MPs. You might think this was mere hyperbole, rather than literally meant, but the point is that he really would prefer Nigel Farage, or (for that matter) Boris Johnson or Liz Truss. These people have never been shy about admitting their hierarchy of acceptable politics.

Mason at least professes to abhor Farage, but that's really just to maintain his anti-Fascist credentials among credulous liberals and his self-deluding image as a latterday SPD street-fighter that the Labour Party would be foolish not to select as a prospective parliamentary candidate for a seat in the North. Tyrone is honest enough to admit that the political centre in this country is occupied by people who would much rather see Farage in Number 10 than anyone happy to self-describe as a socialist, which funnily enough is a more accurate historical echo of Germany in 1933, when the centre-right paved the way for Hitler, than Mason's crass analogy. Another example of centrist fantasy, built to obscure the reality of right-leaning preferences, comes from the journalist Ian Dunt. 

The "soft left" in Labour barely exists outside of the media's imagination and is certainly not organisationally robust enough to fight anyone. The mystery of the missing "soft-right" is easily explained: they're all in the Labour Party furiously fighting the left. In simple terms, the political establishment, which is coterminus with the widest definition of "the centre", has decided that it will not fight the far-right because the electorate is made up of incorrigible racists. The protestors outside asylum hostels must be placated with guff about "legitimate concerns", until they overstep the mark at which point they become suitable fodder for a crackdown. Meanwhile, Nigel Farage must be indulged not only by the rightwing press and a complacent BBC but by the political establishment as a whole. Instead, attention must be focused on the threat from the left, who must be stamped on hard along with anyone deemed a proxy, such as trans men and women or protestors against genocide.


Centrist commentators who loudly gave Israel the benefit of the doubt for years, and who now regretfully inform us that they may have been wrong to do so, are demanding that they be applauded for changing their minds. There is no humility or contrition, merely a testy anger that they have been bested in analysis by ageing hippies and pink-haired kids. Some have even taken to aggressively denouncing the left, who have been proved right, for not welcoming them into the big tent of bien pensant opinion, insisting that in the face of starving children what matters is civility and tone. What these sociopaths are ultimately defending is their authority within the politico-media complex. To that end, it is necessary that they continue to construct a leftwing bogey that can act as the scapegoat for the projected charges of naivety and delusion. For many of them, the launch of a new party by Corbyn and Sultana is a blessing.

Friday, 18 July 2025

What Determines Rent?

The popular discussion of economics divides into macro and micro, with those familiar with the former tending to adopt a slightly patronising attitude towards the latter (the legacy of Keynes' de haut en bas style), which in turn sees them map onto a left-right spectrum. This is misleading, not only because macroeconomics has historically been an attempt to reconcile classical liberalism with the reality of the state as an economic actor, thereby excluding the need for a socialist or Marxist analysis, but because it tends to omit large swathes of the real economy. A famous example was the lack of attention paid to finance and banking as a systemic vulnerability prior to 2008. But an even more prevalent omission in the popular macroeconomic discourse, which was once central to economics in the days of Adam Smith and David Ricardo, is the role of rent.

Smith laid out the basic proposition: "The rent of land, therefore, considered as the price paid for the use of the land, is naturally a monopoly price. It is not at all proportioned to what the landlord may have laid out upon the improvement of the land, or to what he can afford to take; but to what the farmer can afford to give." Ricardo formulated this as a general law, to wit that the rent of a piece of land will equal the additional monetary gain of its productive use relative to the production of a rent-free piece of land. In other words, tenant farmers will desert high-rent land if the rent exceeds the marginal loss they would incur by farming a rent-free piece of land. 

This theory was useful in an era when many people were tenant farmers and when colonialism was bringing marginal (i.e. rent-free) land into production, so the idea of farmers upping sticks to find a more economically advantageous plot wasn't as unrealistic as it seems to us today. Obviously the externalities of colonialism were ignored while rent was seen as a product of natural endowment - the gift of heaven -  and the industry of white colonisers (cf Locke). Subsequent attempts, e.g. by Marx, were made to focus on the capital investment of land, its improvement in Smith's terms, and how natural endowment in reality gives rise to rentierism, i.e. monopoly exploitation, notably in the area of patents and technical innovation (as theorised by Joseph Schumpeter).

The one area of rent that has tended to receive far less attention from economists, in terms of explaining what determines its price, is the rent of property, and specifically houses and flats. This might seem odd given how large rent looms in our lives. Even if you have bought a property or are currently paying a mortgage to do so, you are subject to rent insofar as house prices will always reflect the equivalent contract rent - i.e. what you could get if you let it over the same period as a typical mortgage (hence buy-to-let). Many people assume that the dynamic of this relationship works in the opposite direction: high house prices lead to high rents, and that rising house prices are simply the consequence of demand outstripping supply, hence the arguments that we should ease planning restrictions or curtail immigration, but this ignores that there is no shortage of empty or under-occupied houses and flats across the country. So what determines rent?

The law of supply says that more goods will be produced at higher prices. In other words, if demand for a commodity grows, thereby pushing up the price, producers will increase output to take advantage of the larger demand and thus fatter profit margins. The law of demand says that at higher prices demand falls. So once supply of that commodity exceeds demand, following that increase in output, prices will fall back to their notional equilibrium level. This simplistic model obviously ignores a lot of real world frictions and contraints. For example, not all commodities can be rapidly produced at a higher rate, e.g. by adding shifts or converting existing production lines. Likewise, if the market is cartelised there may be a reluctance among producers to increase output excessively. OPEC is the obvious example here.


In the case of housing, there are real constraints such as restrictive planning regulations and limited real resources (builders and building materials), but the biggest determinant is the reluctance of volume builders to over-supply the market and so depress prices. In this context, the state is a volume builder that has taken a self-denying ordinance to maintain house prices, both for owner-occupiers and landlords, which is why the UK government is so reluctant to build council houses despite the pressing need, and why US liberals like Ezra Klein and Derek Thompson argue that "abundance" can be achieved by simply rolling back regulations and striking out building codes, which provides an easy excuse to ignore capitalist realities in favour of a technocratic can-doism.

The "law" of demand is also undermined by necessity. In other words, there are certain things we have to buy, at least at a minimal level, such as shelter, food and clothing, lest we risk injury or death (self-sufficiency is not a practical strategy for most people and a return to a subsistence economy would result in mass starvation). We cannot realistically choose not to buy shelter, preferring to spend our money on first editions or champagne, so demand cannot fall to such low levels that prices must drop. Equally, we cannot easily cut back on the amount we spend on shelter, unlike certain other necessities such as food or clothes. We can skip meals or wear socks with holes in them, but we can't decide to move to a cheaper flat for a month and then back again to ease our cashflow.

When we talk of "the housing market" (singular) we are dealing in a fantasy. In reality, there are hundreds, if not thousands, of geographically limited housing markets, which estate and letting agents understand only too well. Goods (i.e. houses and flats) cannot be moved from one market to another, so prices must always reflect local circumstances. We also cannot easily choose to buy from alternative suppliers in cheaper markets. If I work in London but can't afford the rent, there's no point renting a flat in Sunderland. And if I got an equivalent job in Sunderland, it might not pay well enough to allow me to rent there either.

When house prices or rents do fall, that is typically because of a relative over-supply in a limited geographical market. But when this happens it is rarely because the quantum of supply rapidly increases. Instead it is because the quantum of demand rapidly falls. The obvious examples are all around us: areas that saw deindustrialisation in the 1980s with the result that the population shrank. But the fall in house prices and rents in those areas also reflects the lower average income of the remaining population: deindustrialisation typically took away above-average wage jobs, and they were above-average in most cases due to the strength of trade unions in heavy industries like coal, steel and shipbuilding. Outside these geographic exceptions, house prices and rents rarely if ever fall, something that cannot be explained away as price "stickiness" or the lower bound of a zero return on capital.

Rents then will always reflect "what the market can bear", which is a polite way of saying that landlords will push prices up to their maximum: the point where tenants can just about afford them, assuming they're willing to limit expenditure on other goods, which may be discretionary, such as entertainment, but may also be necessities, such as food and clothing. The "cost of living crisis" due to the recent spike in food and energy costs shouldn't distract from the fact that the prices of these other necessities are, in real terms, a fraction of what they were 50 years ago. That rents have grown over this period is not because people have felt that housing was a better choice for their discretionary expenditure, despite the relentless media propaganda, but because landlords have, in Smith's words, constantly recalibrated what the tenant can afford to give.

Sunday, 13 July 2025

Everything Must Change For Everything to Remain the Same

We've reached that stage in the political cycle where commentators are beginning to wonder why the government keeps screwing up. The immediate prompt for this was the passing of the latest welfare bill, which generated a minor backbench revolt and a "dilution" that means it isn't as stunningly mean-spirited as originally intended. Beyond the theatrics of Westminster, the government continues to pursue its programme. Not the one it was elected on, but the one it intended to enact all along, which bears an uncanny resemblance to the received wisdom of twenty years ago, hence ideas such as a national ID card have resurfaced while a rebranded Sure Start has got Polly Toynbee trilling with delight. 

There are obviously tonal differences between Blair and Starmer, and these have even been offered as an explanation for the current government's struggles. For example, Stephen Bush has decided that the Prime Minister has no real interest in policy beyond justice and security, which was a useful insight when made by Oliver Eagleton in The Starmer Project in 2022 but seems otiose now. Starmer's brief was to recover the Labour Party from the left. That he then won the general election was a bonus, but it's churlish to condemn him for being narrow-minded and dull when those were the qualities necessary to fulfill the original brief. There is a hint in Bush's reading of Starmer that the chief cock-ups, notably the Winter Fuel Allowance imbroglio, can be laid at the door of the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

Simon Wren-Lewis is baffled that the government didn't recognise that tax rises were inevitable immediately on taking office. He doesn't mention Rachel Reeve's crap impression of Captain Renaud, shocked to discover what a mess the Tories had left, which would have reinforced the point, perhaps because he wishes to find an explanation for the Chancellor's behaviour that doesn't highlight her cynicism (if nothing else, those tears mean everyone will try not to be mean to her for a week or two). The best he can come up with is: "that they accepted that George Osborne was correct: the size of the state under New Labour was too large, and he was essentially right to shrink it. This meant Labour in government would be a more competent version of a post-Osborne Conservative government." 

But rather than accept the charge of the left that there is an ideological congruence between this government and that of the 2010-16 period, Wren-Lewis insists that this was simply a political misjudgement. Likewise he attributes the government's attempts to outbid Reform on immigration to error: giving undue salience to the issue and echoing Nigel Farage's lies about the impact on public services. At this point you might wonder if telling "lies" is evidence of misjudgment or maybe something else. Starmer's track record of deceit and dissimulation in his ascent to the party leadership can lead one to assume that he has no fixed beliefs, but you don't accidentally employ the language of Enoch Powell unless there is some base sympathy.

Simon's prescription for the government to turn round its unpopularity is to be more honest about the need for tax rises, to "plausibly argue that while everyone is promising lower immigration, only they are doing so in a way that doesn’t damage the economy", and finally to start admitting that Brexit has been a mistake. The latter should be emphasised not only because it is true, and will become more evident to voters over time, but in order to remind voters that Farage was one of the chief authors of that calamity. For good measure, he also suggests pointing out that the chaos of the Trump administration is a harbinger of what we could expect from a Farage premiership. 

In his final analysis, Wren-Lewis is pessimistic, anticipating that the government will not raise taxes sufficiently, that they will continue to ape Reform on immigration and that they will fail to be open and honest about the costs of Brexit. Given that he set out to explain why Labour have made these mistakes in office, you might feel a little short-changed. Insofar as he points the finger, it is to suggest that Morgan McSweeney may be less clever than his mates in the media suggest and that Starmer hasn't understood "the difference between being in opposition and government". But naivety on the part of Starmer is no more explanatory than the trope of the king's evil advisor.

Andy Beckett, whose modus operandi is to ask innocent questions, focuses not on the economic logic for tax rises but on the moral case for redistribution. He often overdoes the disingenousness. Thus he is correct to point out that "Creating a more egalitarian society and politics – which by definition means redistribution from the powerful – was Labour’s original purpose", but there are surely few people, even in the party itself, who imagine that egalitarianism continues to be a motivating force rather than a mere shibboleth. The mantra of New Labour, and centrist political parties in most other developed countries from the 1980s onwards, was that growth would deliver improved public goods, and thus ameliorate inquality, but that we must therefore prioritise wealth creation and so coddle the wealth creators. 

It was, in effect, the centre-left version of trickle-down economics, with the state providing a more concrete presence than the invisible hand of the market. The problem, evident to all since 2008, is that underlying growth was anemic, artifically amplified by financial speculation in the preceding decades. The steadily-encroaching climate crisis has called into question whether growth is even viable, and we may find ourselves struggling to stand still as decades of under-investment cause the fabric of public life to start falling apart. If the cake can't be rapidly enlarged, then inevitably politics will turn to the question of how big our relative slices should be. 

The answer to the question "Why is Labour so afraid to admit that we must tax the rich?" is therefore quite simple. It remains committed to the idea that wealth must be coddled. To that end, public goods must be rationed so that the state's share of GDP doesn't rise and ideally falls. What Beckett describes as New Labour's strategy of redistribution by stealth (the minimum wage, family tax credits etc), but which would be better called "trickle down", is no longer viable because economic growth will not produce tax revenues sufficient to address the growing demand for public goods. The reforms suggested to boost productivity, such as deregulating planning, are hopelessly inadequate, while the one available change that would boost the economy quickly - completely reversing Brexit - is politically unpalatable.

The Blairite Philip Collins thinks that we are facing an era of small party politics and thus of coalition government. The fragmentation of support in the opinion polls is real enough, but we shouldn't imagine that this reflects a greater volatility among voters. The British system was built on two mass parties that acted as informal coalitions: the "broad church" in Labour's case. Together with the trope of the swing voter, this gave the impression of structural stability and marginal shifts. Underneath was a wide variety of views across the electorate and often vicious contests within the parties themselves. What has happened since then is that both main parties have become narrower and more intolerant of dissent, largely due to Brexit (the Conservatives) and the war on the left (Labour). The inevitable consequence is that voters look elsewhere.

Collins's future preference is for a grand coalition of Labour, the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats, though with the implicit rider that the Tories return to the sensible centre, leaving the crazies to Reform and the lefties fragmented and ineffective across the Greens, various independents and whatever vehicle Corbyn and Sultana manage to launch. What this daydream ignores is that so long as MPs are elected on a first-past-the-post basis, Nigel Farage is more likely to be a king-maker than Ed Davey. Indeed, a Labour-Reform coalition is far from being improbable. Collins may be right that Labour supporters are "inveterately hostile to a deal with Reform", but that doesn't apply to the PLP. 

As this point it is worth recalling that Simon Wren-Lewis saw the government echoing George Osborne and apeing Nigel Farage as misjudgements, as evidence of Starmer's political naivety. The troubling reality may be that just as there has been an ideological congruence between Labour and the Tories on the need to privilege wealth since the 90s, so there is now a meeting of minds between both parties and Reform on the need to lower immigration and welfare rolls. And don't expect the Lib Dems or Greens to mount an effective opposition to that emerging consensus.


We're facing a future in which no one party can command anywhere near a majority of the electorate, not because there aren't policies that command public support but because the cartel isn't prepared to put them to the vote - most obviously a meaningful wealth tax, but also nationalisation of utilities - and will happily fragment the party system if it means the same people can stay in power through increasingly squalid coalition deals. In Lampedusa's The Leopard the famous maxim is that everything must change for everything to remain the same. In reality, it was a change in outward forms, the compromise of the fading aristocracy and the emerging bourgeoisie, not a change in the fundamental class relations of capital and labour. To maintain the privileges of wealth, the British party system will be broken apart.

Saturday, 21 June 2025

Uncomfortable Truths

The British state is no stranger to formally recording ethnicity, from census-taking to the analysis of healthcare outcomes, but the purpose has typically been to make minorities legible in the context of trying to avoid negative discrimination, or at least trying to satisfy the critics of institutional racism. Parallel to this has been the tacit prejudice of officials: the police's discriminatory use of stop-and-search against Black youth, the DWP's disproportionate sanctioning of ethnic minority claimants. What we have not seen for many years is government policy directed towards formal monitoring on the basis that ethnicity and religion are causal factors in the formation of criminals rather than the characteristics of victims of crime or discrimination, though you could argue that the Prevent programme went there in all but name in using "Islamic radicalisation" as a proxy for the institutional suspicion of Asians, Arabs and Muslim converts. 

The "audit" of child sexual exploitation (CSE) cases undertaken by Louise Casey at the government's behest has "criticised a continued failure to gather robust data at a national level" on ethnicity, but also tells us that offenders in three police areas were "disproportionately likely to be Asian men", while further suggesting that "Ignoring the issues, not examining and exposing them to the light, allows the criminality and depravity of a minority of men to be used to marginalise whole communities." That last point is a case of using the traditional justification for monitoring, the need to prevent harm being done to a whole community, to justify a prejudice about that same community.

Casey's claim that it is "not racist to examine the ethnicity of the offenders" is a distraction. The charge isn't that it is racist but that it is irrelevant. After all, what would the outcome be if we discovered a national correlation? Would we conclude that it was the product of "cultural or social" factors, as Yvette Cooper, the Home Secretary, all but suggested in her brief to Casey, or might we ask whether the correlation was spurious but indicative of something more relevant. For example, the higher rate of drug-deaths in Scotland, compared to England and Wales, certainly correlates with cultural and social factors, but this has not led to the demonisation of Scottish society or suggestions there is something awry in its culture. That's because the significant correlation is with deindustrialisation and deprivation, not sectarian football rivalry or a fondness for shortbread. 

If a correlation with culture and social factors is established in respect of grooming gangs - and let's not be under any illusions that this is the only acceptable outcome for many, not only on the far right but in the respectable centre of politics too - what consequential actions might the government take? Will all men of Pakistani heritage be expected to get DBS certificates? And perhaps wear them pinned prominently to their jackets.

We know that crime correlates with opportunity. This is why police officers are disproportionately more likely to be convicted of corruption in a public office, or small business people of VAT fraud. If an ethnic minority is disproportionately represented in the night-time economy of fast food outlets and taxis, then the attraction that these hold for vulnerable youngsters will inevitably create opportunities for abuse. But nobody is suggesting that those parts of the economy need to be more closely regulated or policed. This stands in contrast with the response to institutionalised child sexual exploitation in children's homes and borstals. As the facts steadily came to light over the decades, there was a concerted effort to enact controls and safeguards. The ripples of this interventionist approach continue down to today, with scandals and chastening reform affecting such august bodies as the BBC and the Church of England: the very heart of the British establishment. That this initiative has slowly shifted focus shift away from the disciplinary state of the 1970s to the contemporary agencies of social authority is no accident. 


The political opportunity afforded by CSE is in the realm of hegemony, the chance to define the sacred and the profane and thus define new boundaries between the good people and the bad, hence the Conservative and Reform parties have sought both to advance a racist narrative - the threat to "white British women" - and to pin the blame on the failures of a liberal elite. There are obvious overlaps with the "I don't recognise this country anymore" crowd of proud bigots, but also with those Labour politicians, such as Cooper and Starmer, who appear to imagine that ceding the essence of the racist argument - that these "strangers" are a threat to national identity and cohesion - and pandering to "legitimate concerns" will allow them to channel public opinion towards their own brand of authoritarian mangerialism. 

The term "uncomfortable truths" is a rhetorical advance on "legitimate concerns" in that it suggests ichoate fears have been replaced by incontrovertible facts, but there's really no practical difference in use. Whereas the older term sought justification the more en vogue one appeals to subjectivity. The result is an ironic detournement of the language attributed to "snowflakes" - "I'm not comfortable with that" - in the cause of confrontation. It isn't the people who use the term who are expected to be uncomfortable, after all.

Casey's claim that the ethnicity of perpetrators is "shied away from" doesn't stand up to scrutiny. The simplest explanation for why ethnicity was not systematically recorded in respect of child sexual exploitation cases is that it wasn't deemed relevant, not because police officers were scared of upsetting local communities that they otherwise barely tolerated, or because grizzled council officials were excessively "woke". This doesn't mean they were oblivious, but that they treated ethnicity informally as an explanatory factor: "What do you expect from these people?", much as they assumed the (usually) working-class girls entrapped by these gangs were "slappers" or "teenage prostitutes". They now have a green light to formalise their prejudices. Having turned that light on, it is both disingenuous and hypocritical of Casey to subsequently claim that we shouldn't over-interpret the "data", and for Labour politicians to claim that the Tories are trying to "politicise the scandal". 

One thing that the government appears to have given little thought to is how far the monitoring of ethnicity is likely to spread in the criminal justice system, which could indicate naivety but is perhaps more likely to indicate comfort with its maximum employment. For example, I suspect we're going to see pushback against the long campaign to restrain stop-and-search in London. If the data on ethnicity shows that men of Jamaican heritage are disproportionately involved in drug-peddling then the Metropolitan Police will argue they have reason to target Black kids in South London for frisking. Just don't expect a report any time soon confronting the uncomfortable truth that white ex-public schoolboys are disproportionately involved in City fraud and suggesting that Eton and Harrow have questions to answer. But just as ethnic and religious monitoring was originally about making under-served and peripheral communities legible to the state, in the ostensible service of integration and equity, so this latest turn will also keep a narrow focus on those groups deemed to be outside of the nation, or at least semi-detached and potentially disloyal. To be monitored has never been a privilege.

Saturday, 14 June 2025

Woke

The first thing to note about Gaby Hinsliff's extended essay in the Guardian is the title: How does woke start winning again?, which suggests that woke had a successful period of dominance in the recent past. The standfirst also employs the idea of progress halted, but with the implication that this was inevitable due to the misjudged approach of campaigners: "British progressives have suffered major setbacks in recent years, in both public opinion and court rulings. Was a backlash inevitable, and are new tactics needed?" Hinsliff would no doubt point out that journalists don't write their own headlines or standfirsts, but neither is unrepresentative of the essay in suggesting that woke is simultaneously hegemonic and embattled. This confusion arises because of her use of "woke" and "progressive" as interchangeable whern they are actually quite different and often in conflict. Wokeness is a critique of actually existing conditions, specifically a recognition of systemic injustice. Progressivism, as conservatives often point out, is a secular teleology based on the religious idea of the perfectibility of humanity, but one whose lofty aims are in practice subservient to quietism and the defence of the status quo, not because the ultimate triumph is not in doubt, but because of its imbrication with liberalism.

Hinsliff starts by recalling the Black Lives Matter protest in Bristol in 2020 that led to the statue of Edward Colston being toppled and dumped in the harbour. She notes of the recovered statue and contemporary protest placards that they "evoke the radicalism of a summer that already feels oddly consigned to history, when frustration erupted on to the streets but never quite seemed to be channelled into lasting change." What's missing here is the way that the protests were channelled by the media into a debate about statues, and then into a fruitless standoff against the far right who answered the implicit call to defend our stone heritage against the leftist wreckers, resulting in Tommy Robinson fans careering drunkenly down Whitehall with one them unironically pissing on the memorial to a murdered policeman in Parliament Square. Though that incontinent "defender" was jailed for 14 days, there was quiet satisfaction among the establishment that the BLM protests had been derailed. If Hinsliff is looking for the legacy of that summer, she might consider last year's attacks on asylum seekers and the language of beleaguerment employed by the press and politicians (an "island of strangers" etc.)

Both liberal and conservative commentaries on "wokeness" play fast and loose with history. Conservatives tend to accuse critics of presentism, of applying today's values to actions that in their historical context were neither remarkable nor seen as objectionable. This invariably ignores that in many cases those actions were condemned at the time, slavery being an obvious example and colonialism another. Liberal commentaries take a different approach because of the belief in progress: the aim is to detach today's protest from history, as if the protestors weren't keeping to the progressive script. This is done by recasting the history as meek and mild, the protestors as unobjectionable and even heroes by today's standards. Hinsliff cites Bristolian antecedents "once considered shockingly radical but now celebrated without question: Theresa Garnett, the suffragette who brandished a horsewhip at Winston Churchill at Bristol Temple Meads station, or the heroes of the 1963 Bristol bus boycott, who walked to work in protest against the bus company’s refusal to hire black drivers (and helped pave the way for the 1965 Race Relations Act)". The bus boycott was not considered "shockingly radical" at the time. Indeed more people were probably shocked at the collusion of the TGWU in enforcing a colour bar, while simultaneously opposing Apartheid in South Africa, than in black (and white) Bristolians refusing to use the buses.


Liberal commentators often appropriate radical history to suggest that progressive change would have happened anyway (Martin Luther King's "arc of history" line predictably makes an appearance, his critique of capitalism does not) and to highlight the unhelpfulness of "activists" in advancing that cause. It is a constant exercise to remove the taint of radicalism from any successful development and reserve the term for those considered wrong turns or dead ends, the orginal case study being the French Revolution. This leads not only to misrepresentation but to a simplification of once-challenging concepts. Thus Hinsliff claims the term was "borrowed from a phrase used as far back as the 1930s by black Americans, urging each other to “stay woke’” to the threat of racial violence". In fact, the phrase originally meant staying alert to the reality of systemic racism, in other words the polite refusals and condescensions rather than the lynchings. As such, the word has expanded to cover an appreciation of other forms of systemic repression and abuse, but it hasn't really changed its meaning, let alone been "borrowed". It is a critique of the liberal worldview in which progress is inevitable, incremental and defined by those already in positions of authority. 

Hinsliff does correctly note that the "war on woke" has been turbo-boosted in the UK by the recent Supreme Court judgement on the interpretation of sex in the 2010 Equalities Act, but she counterpoints this with other examples of an anti-woke turn across the political spectrum: Reform's anti-woke platform (which is mostly hot air), Starmer's turn to reactionary rhetoric (which heralds nasty policy), and Ash Sarkar's media-friendly book in which an irritation with identity politics and decolonisation is given a leftwing patina by the appeal to class. This allows Hinsliff to claim a consensus: "On all sides, woke has become shorthand less for a set of widely accepted liberal beliefs – few people today would put a slaver on a pedestal – than an associated style of highly online activism, seen as prone to denouncing opponents as morally evil, engaging in competitive victimhood and favouring performative protest over practical change." This is a conservative characterisation in its emphasis on perversity and futility, but also a liberal characterisation in its obsession with civility and decorum.

Trying to find a way forward (remember, the standfirst suggests that progressives need "new tactics"), Hinsliff turns to Luke Tryl of the cross-party More in Common think-tank. Ignoring the cringe-worthy marketing methodology of "political tribes", we find the claim that "Progressive Activists [are] further from mainstream public opinion on cultural issues than they realise. They’re the only group where a majority thinks that immigration should be as high or higher than it is now, and that protecting people from hate speech matters more than defending free speech (a key rationale behind “no debate” – the idea that trans identities aren’t up for discussion – and “no platforming”)." This ignores that progressives, defined by More in Common as "well-educated, highly engaged", are more likely to have an accurate understanding of levels of immigration, i.e. that they are much lower than the impression given by the media and consequently the common perception, hence "further from mainstream public opinion" isn't quite the gotcha Tryl imagines. It also ignores that we have laws against hate speech but no formal rights to free speech. Insofar as free speech needs defending, it is from restrictions on the right to protest, not from protestors.


Tryl's key conclusion, presumably shared by Hinsliff, is that "Progressive Activists overestimate by a factor of two to three how much others agree with their core beliefs, from abolishing the monarchy to letting children change gender. Consequently they tend to invest too little time on persuasion, focusing instead on mobilising the masses they wrongly imagine are on board." This is interpreted as arrogance and self-absorption by "purists", rather than a tendency to think well of other people or even the naivety of the unworldly, echoing the traditional conservative critique of reform. Again, notice the conservative emphasis on futility: don't protest, kids; you'll only alienate the silent majority. Hinsliff picks up the theme: "Core to woke philosophy is what is sometimes called “systemic thinking”, or the idea that society consists of overlapping systems of oppression, from capitalism to patriarchy, which we are socialised not to notice and to which we must be awoken by unpacking the power dynamics hidden in everyday interactions". This neatly undermines her own stunted history of the term, but it also undermines the claim that the woke don't care about explanation or persuasion: a systemic critique is literally a case of "Have you thought about it this way?" rather than "I have the key to all the mysteries" (or "rejecting supporters who don’t endorse a complete worldview", as she puts it).

Hinsliff resolves this by a retreat to the liberal concerns with civility and decorum. The woke are simply rude and offensive: "dismissive of other people’s small but well-meaning efforts ... correcting other people’s “mistakes” ... pile-ons and point-scoring ... shouting". This results in a line that wouldn't have been out of place in the Daily Mail or Daily Telegraph when she raises the topic of class: "Were activists who scolded critics to “educate yourself” or “do the reading”, while speaking the language of undergraduate sociology essays, always likely to grate on the two-thirds of British adults who don’t have degrees?" Not only has she shrunk the Progressive Activists that More in Common estimate constitute 10% of the population down to a bunch of mouthy students, but they all appear to have studied sociology, a subject that has been in dramatic decline for 40 years now. This is like a cartoon in Private Eye, circa 1981, printed on the opposite page to the latest Dave Spart column. At this point Hinsliff rather loses her way, with discursions into whether woke language has hamstrung the Labour Party (a reminder that "the many, not the few" was first employed by Labour under Blair in the revamped Clause IV) and the tale of an academic who steadily moved to the right because he was challenged by students (a tale as old as academia). 

The essay finishes with some anecdotes from climate protestors whose purpose is to convince us that dramatic protests have had their day and we must work more cautiously in "an era of populist politics, tight budgets and renewed emphasis on energy security". While we are meant to submit to these artificial constraints (who sets the budget, Gaby?), the planet fries. Perhaps the most depressing part of this is Hinsliff's conclusion that this new sobriety and maturity (she doesn't use those words, but they hover over the entire essay) "reflects growing interest within the climate movement in focusing on what Roger Harding, co-director of the small eco-charity Round Our Way, calls “working-class, red wall voters who are not about to become vegan anytime soon” but still worry about the planet." After the caricature of domineering, middle class, twenty-something activists patronising the proles with their fancy jargon, we get the caricature of a reactionary working class that must be indulged in its prejudices in order to bring it onside for incremental change. For all that it reads like a cross between a Times editorial and an undergraduate essay on Animal Farm (see, anyone can do this), Hinsliff's magnum opus never loses sight of its main contention: that we can only have nice things if we behave ourselves and don't badger the authorities.