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Friday, 25 November 2022

Mastodon

The last couple of weeks have seen the emergence of a new sub-genre in the press coverage of social media: my struggles with Mastodon. While not uniformly negative, these tales have relished the authors' cluelessness in the face of baffling concepts like "federated" and "instance". This is partly the traditional journalistic pose: you, dear readers, are idiots so I will perform idiocy as a way of explaining this new thing to you. But it also points to the underlying hatred for social media (which is really a hatred for democracy) that runs like a thread through newspaper coverage of the subject, and which is by no means limited to Twitter (the journalists' drug of choice), even if these articles inevitably serve as yet another excuse for linking the bird site in particular to the "toxic slurry" that supposedly disfigures our society. It becomes clear reading this sub-genre that what journalists really want is an environment that reflects their own self-worth. Unsurprisingly, some competitors to Twitter have sought to emphasise this, e.g. Post claims to be a platform for "Real People, Real News, and Civil Conversations". If that doesn't attract the liberal scolds then nothing will.

It's therefore amusing that Mastodon should have become the early leader in the field of alternatives to Twitter, given that it isn't particularly user-friendly and its politics (or at least those of its creator, Eugen Rochko) appear to be to the left of your average journalist. This is partly because so many other challengers have been promoted by the right, e.g. Parler and Truth Social, but partly because the politico-media caste have never really wanted to leave Twitter. Their fundamental criticism was not that it didn't do enough to counter abuse - it should be obvious now, as Elon Musk dismantles much of the moderation regime, that it actually did a good job in keeping a lid on it - but that it still allowed ordinary grunts on the platform. What they wanted was a more exclusive environment in which they could praise each other's "brilliant" articles or issue vapid press releases without getting laughed at by the great unwashed. Of course the problem with such exclusivity is that it can backfire, as the hilarious tale of journa.host reveals (in a nutshell: journalists set up their own instance; lots of other instances immediately defederated because they didn't want their content being scraped for stories).

Mastodon isn't going to supplant Twitter and the reason for that is as much to do with the technology as the cultural values. It is a halfway house between a fully distributed social network and a cloud-based common service. Conceptually, the former would require every user to provide and administer their own server. The point is that there would be no shared infrastructure beyond the Internet itself - i.e. the protocols that allow you to send and receive messages over a network. In practice a fully distributed system is constrained by the need to provide servers. Most users won't want the cost and hassle of providing their own, and they certainly don't want the administrative overhead this would entail. In other words, what Mastodon provides is both a collection of servers and (crucially) a devolved community of administrators. The rapid growth in the user base is causing the former to buckle under the strain, though this can be alleviated by throwing money at the problem and upgrading capacity, but the real choke point is the latter. Who wants to spend their free time reviewing sign-up requests and moderating content?

We've been here before. Mastodon is esentially a modern version of Usenet, the distributed bulletin board system that dates from the early 1980s. The similarities between Usenet groups and Mastodon instances, notably the discrimination over which peers to share feeds with, should be obvious. It should also be obvious that social media developed in part as a solution to the limitations of that older technology, not least the relative lawlessness of its group moderation (by the end, it was mostly being used for illegal file-sharing). Once access to the Internet was cheap and reliable, services could be consolidated "in the cloud", but this entailed a centralised administration as well. To pay for that, most social media services mixed advertising in with the user-generated content, which in turn created the incentives for surveillance and opaque algorithms. There's recently been a move towards more subscription-based services (e.g. Substack), but that has been driven more by the desire to monetise user content than to find an alternative to advertising. 


Mastodon cannot service a population the size of Twitter's near 400 million (it currently has less than one percent of that figure). The announcement by celebrities like Stephen Fry that they have moved over should alert us to the fact that its new users are overwhelmingly unlikely to want to provide their own servers or conduct content moderation, even if they knew how to do so. The "fediverse" depends on a community of nerds, and for those nerds to be a significant percentage of the total user base, willing to dedicate their own equipment and time to the common good. What's happening now is that Mastodon is attracting the jocks. To service this larger community individual instances will need to add both computing and moderation resources, and that ultimately means charging users. Given that the jocks are used to free stuff, this is either going to kill the growth or lead to Mastodon abandoning its principled objections to advertising and therefore surveillance. That is a bridge too far so pleas for donations are likely to dominate for the next few months. Ironically, the much foretold death of Twitter may be pushed out of the news shortly by the sudden death of multiple Mastodon instances.

As others have noted, the volume of users and posts that a celebrity brings in their train can amount to an unwitting denial of service attack for a Mastodon instance near the limit of its server capacity. That many instances now appear to be blocking or at least slowing new sign-ups is hardly a surprise. This highlights that the "cloud" has long served to obscure the fact that a person's online social network is not simply a matter of follower numbers but of linked activity, and that activity has a material cost in terms of the infrastructure required to support it. The blitheness with which media personalities announce that they're moving from Twitter to Mastodon (or to other platforms) is as good an example of dumb privilege as you can find online these days. When celebrities moan about their fans' presumption ("They think they own a bit of me") they forget that this proprietorial attitude cuts both ways. Imagining that your followers will loyally troop over to another platform ignores that a social network is not the product of your person but an emergent property of the medium. 

The growth of Mastodon, and the challenges faced by users in trying to join and navigate it, may create an opportunity for someone with a more commercial mindset than Rochko. Just as tools like TweetDeck sought to make Twitter more user-friendly (before being absorbed into the product), so we are likely to see a flurry of interfaces that seek to "simplify" Mastodon. In seeking to mask the limitations of the platform from "ordinary" users, it will make technical sense to consolidate this interface layer, creating a cloud-based superservice that will function pretty much like Twitter. But because of that consolidation and user affordance, it will face the same issues of moderation, regulatory observance and the need for a revenue stream to pay for its infrastructure. What this should remind us is that what people like about Twitter is the fact that it isn't federated: that it provides the serendipity of "weak ties" rather than the claustrophobia of a parochial interest group. That so many users find the "fediverse" baffling should be a clear indicator of that.

Twitter has barely changed since Musk bought it. The company may have seen upheaval aplenty in its personnel and working culture, and you can't rule out the possibility that bits of the system are going to start failing, but the idea that users would be driven away is clearly nonsense. The liberal media's critique is essentially that they'd prefer another owner - less rightwing and less vulgar - but they actually share Musk's vision of a social space that divides the fee-paying sheep from the goats: that is an environment they are familiar with and value. More democratic platforms like Mastodon are not what they want, and you can expect journalists who persist with it to soon take umbrage when administrators moderate them rather than the uncredentialled. The Mastodon sub-genre of newspaper comment is likely to prove short-lived but its demise will probably herald the arrival of another navel-gazing sub-genre: why I've come back to Twitter.

Sunday, 13 November 2022

Social Democracy

The thing to understand about Twitter is that it is made entirely by its users, not simply in terms of the content but in terms of the interaction around that content. Comparable (and more popular) platforms like Facebook, Instagram and TikTok are ultimately narrowcasters whose experience is heavily determined by the feed algorithm. They are social only in the superficial sense that they employ the mechanics of a community - elective association, feedback and ostracism. In reality, they are opaque and controlling environments in which the needs of advertisers are paramount and interaction is limited and of poor quality. Twitter has attempted to pursue a similar path, but it has repeatedly been knocked back by its users (e.g. the preference for the chronological feed over the curated). The platform's anarchic, antisocial reputation arises from the fact that it is the most social environment, and one in which communities are formed less by the algorithm and more by actual social behaviours. The takeover of Twitter by Elon Musk has been reported mostly in terms of the financials - i.e. whether he overpaid for it and how he is going to ensure it makes a profit in the future - but the real issue is whether it will remain the best (if still numerically inferior) social medium we have.

It's now clear that Musk's intention is to divide Twitter into effectively two social spaces: the checkmarked subscribers and the great unwashed. The former will be spared advertising, the latter subjected to it. The former will be prioritised in the feed algorithm, the latter deprioritised (on the spurious grounds that this will help suppress bots and spam). These two spaces will overlap - the non-blue-tick will still be able to follow the blue-tick - but it is clear that Musk's vision is essentially one of soft segregation in which current antisocial practices (e.g. the mass blocking of the followers of followers, the limiting of replies etc) will become the norm. Unless you pay your subs (and perhaps not even then, if the rumours about pricing tiers prove true) you will be excluded from certain conversations. This development isn't simply the standard premium/freemium model in software pricing: it's an exercise in class engineering. And that class division reflects the prejudices and structural assumptions of the analogue world, particularly as mediated by the traditional press. 

As Janan Ganesh of the FT declared in explaining his decision to quit Twitter (which he did some time ago): "The site reeks of low status. And not because it is free." Despite his protestations, he clearly associates virtue with price: "“The elite don’t tweet,” I want to say, but some of them do, including its new owner. It just happens to cheapen them." So why did Ganesh really quit Twitter? A clue is provided in this claim: "There is no one trait that links all the high performers — in sport, art, politics, commerce — that I have had occasion to meet. But the nearest thing is a slightly humourless amour propre. It is the kind of personality that gets short shrift on Twitter, which is part of the site’s charm but also what leaves it with an anti-aspirational feel." As someone whom he blocked for taking the piss, I can confirm that Ganesh is both humourless and conceited. It has long been clear that the strength of Twitter as a medium for expert dissemination has been in tension with its social nature, and this is nowhere more obvious than among journalists who deeply resent that the public consider them fools or liars.


Musk has recognised that Twitter's USP is the calibre of its users. They may be fewer than Facebook or Instagram, but they generate far superior content, and as has always been the case with online communities, there is a stable ratio between heavy creators, heavy commenters and mere spectators (1:10:100). This means that Twitter has an inherent tendency towards elitism as much as democracy (aka "the mob"), which obviously chimes with Musk's own view of the world. The aim then is not simply to monetise the heavy creators and commenters but to institutionally mute the spectators who might occasionally comment and are thus crucial to that organic democracy known as the Twitter ratio. Whether Musk can effect this change without going bust is another matter, but we shouldn't under-estimate the appetite for such a segregated space among the super-rich who may be asked to bail him out.

Musk is held up as a man of the future: a visionary and a creator of new possibilities. But his ideas are actually notable for being old-fashioned: often the dreams of a bygone age. Musk's original break, in which he turned a small fortune into a larger one, was PayPal: a payments processing system that stripped of the online facilitation was really just another form of credit card, and thus a limited advance on the technology of the mid-twentieth century. Since then, Musk's enterprises have tended to gradually retreat further back in time: the hyperloop is an early twentieth century idea revived, the Boring Company is straight out of Jules Verne or HG Wells, while electric cars have been a thing since the nineteenth century. The mission to colonise Mars is arguably of even greater vintage. For this reason, I think it's fair to assume that Musk's plans for Twitter can best be understood by reading Plato rather than anything produced in Silicon Valley in recent years. His claim to be championing "the people" in rejecting the "lords & peasants system" of the old blue-tick in favour of a paid subscription doesn't take us any further forward than John Locke.

The suggestion that Twitter users will desert in droves to Mastodon strikes me as improbable. Not only is that platform likely to quickly buckle under the weight of additional users and greater content moderation demands, but its federated structure will lead to rapid fragmentation. This is perfectly consistent with its technical architecture, but it highlights that Mastodon isn't a cohesive social space so much as a collection of communities, much like the old blogosphere. There isn't an alternative to Twitter unless you want to give up your critical faculties and simply let the Facebook or Instagram alogorithm wash over you: the "atmosphere of domestic mediocrity" that Ganesh identifries with the bird site but which is really more characteristic of its larger rivals. As a result, I think most users will remain on Twitter and will continue to appreciate its benefits even as they are steadily eroded. In other words, I suspect Twitter will prove far more resilient in the face of Musk's "dumb stuff" than the media coverage currently suggests, and that's because it remains a social space in which collective resistance is possible.

Saturday, 5 November 2022

Varieties of Conservatism

The rolling crisis at Westminster since 2008 centres on the failure of our political parties to move on from neoliberalism. This is not simply a case of an interregnum birthing morbid symptoms, but more fundamentally a refusal to countenance change. That might appear paradoxical given the disruption of Brexit and the recent, quickly-aborted experiment in "trickle-down economics", but at heart these were exercises in nostalgia, not fresh departures, and just as fixated on the past as the recurrent anxiety over the diminution of the welfare state (an ever-present theme in the postwar era) and the vogue for a "levelling-up" that gestures towards the social destruction of the past forty years without the need for any redress beyond some ill-defined "infrastructure". This has produced what Colin Crouch describes as "a democratic politics that finds it increasingly difficult to address voters as adults who must think about their collective as well as their individual selves". But I think Crouch underplays the extent to which the parties are casting about for the language of communal interest, whether that be Blue Labour's mawkishness or the Tory right seeking to defend the nation against the "invasion" of Albanian migrants.

Tariq Ali has a not dissimilar analysis but he correctly, in my view, notes how this has given the times a distinctly regressive air. Commenting on the defenestration of Liz Truss he noted: "The outgoing PM is herself a symptom of this social crisis, shaped by Britain’s exhausted financialized economy, bankrupt post-imperial foreign policy, exclusionary parliamentary system and creaking multinational state. What the British ruling class needs is a real conservative government – with or without the capital C – to protect and stabilize this political order. In this sense Starmer would be more sellable than Sunak, since he can be framed as something new rather than something borrowed and something blue. Yet mimicking Thatcher has so far proven useless, and imitating Blair will be no better." As we prepare for Austerity 2.0 and the Labour Party seeks to erase the Corbyn interlude from history, it is clear that what we are witnessing is both a conservative reaction by the establishment and an attempt to conjure a conservative electorate into being in time for the next general election. It's worth looking at this in more detail to understand the relationship of the parties.

According to George Eaton in The New Statesman, "Sunak is the UK’s most Thatcherite prime minister since Thatcher herself". That's pretty meaningless when you consider her contradictory impulses, such as her English chauvinism and her championing of the EU single market, neither of which chime with the current inhabitant of Number 10. What Eaton means is that Sunak is not the technocrat "who will administer harsh but necessary medicine" but is instead an ideologue who will seek to shrink the welfare state and protect class interests. Exactly how that makes him different to any other Conservative Party leader since Margaret Thatcher isn't that clear. Indeed, he looks an awful lot like a Brexity Cameron. Explicitly stating that you will take money from "deprived urban areas" and give it to Tunbridge Wells isn't the novelty Eaton imagines. The rather obvious objective here is not merely to suggest that Keir Starmer is the true "pragmatic centrist", in whom we could expect to find competent, technocratic leadership, but to paint him as the continuity candidate not just of New Labour but of a more responsible Tory tradition that stands in opposition to Thatcher.


The irony is that this means Starmer is being positioned as the Johnsonite candidate. The political commentariat are only too well aware that the former Prime Minister remains popular with the electorally-significant bloc labelled the "red wall", but which more accurately is older voters who own their homes outside of South East England. Labour will be cast as the true party of levelling-up and Sunak as the champion of London and the South East (despite being a Yorkshire MP). The Labour leader's near-pathological reluctance to commit to significant policies, while happily trumpeting socially conservative views, is not some cunning plan that will produce an eye-catching manifesto in two years. It is rather a clear message that he intends minimal change, and will even go so far as to ape the Tories in style as well as substance, a point that his supporters in the press are only too happy to highlight. The suggestion that the party is about to adopt a strategy of shifting taxation from income to wealth, so departing from the orthodoxy of the last 75 years, is wishful-thinking.

One reason I'm sceptical about the lesser evil argument for supporting Labour now is that Starmer shows every sign of wanting to supplant the Tories as the true conservative party, pushing them to the margins as an unrepresentative and reckless party of libertarians with "foreign" ideas. You can dress this strategy up as Labour positioning itself as "the natural party of government", in Harold Wilson's words, but what we are not being offered is the idea of Labour as the party of progressive reform. While Tony Blair paid lip-service to progressive notions, and may even have been sincere about some of them, Starmer has never taken a position that could be considered progressive, let alone radical. This is partly down to electoral calculation - those "red wall" voters - but it also appears to reflect his own temperament. For all the talk of his work as a human rights lawyer, it is clear that the former Director of Public Prosecutions has wholly internalised the establishment's conservative worldview, from trans rights to electoral reform.

As someone once said, there were three of us in this marriage. In addition to Sunak and Starmer, Andrew Bailey, the Bank of England Governor, is also in the business of defining conservatism. It has been much remarked that the two-step of monetary and fiscal policy since 2008 has now changed. Where previously one would offset the other - low interest rates ameliorating some of the pain from cuts to government spending - now we have both pushing in the same direction, which is certain to exacerbate the coming recession. That this is being done to stop inflation exceeding 5%, a historically unremarkable level, indicates that there is a political dimension to the bank's intervention at a time when the government is signalling that it intends to suck demand out of the economy. The issue appears to be the belief that the labour market is too tight, and that this will lead to rising wage demands and thus the potential for upward pressure on prices. It's hard not to believe that the latest hike in interest rates to 3% is a direct response to the current wave of strike action. In other words, it is Bailey, not Sunak, who should be considered the echt Thatcherite.

Friday, 28 October 2022

Arrested Development

The setting of Martin McDonagh's The Banshees of Inisherin is obviously meant to represent a larger canvas. Inisherin literally translates as Island of Ireland. But this may be just one of many misdirections by the writer and director who gleefully toys with the tropes of Irish history. Far from being about Ireland more generally, or the bitter falling-out of the Civil War during which the story is set (an offstage rumble, though with an oblique reference to the execution of 6 anti-Treaty men in Tuam in 1923), this is a more universal tale of a small community committed to superficial stability and social convention but sitting on a seething mass of resentment and spite. The central characters are Colm Doherty (Brendan Gleeson) and Pádraic Súilleabhaín (Colin Farrell), long-time friends whose conventions centre on trivial chat at Jonjo Devine's pub. Aware that he is getting older and believing that he has a duty to develop his talents as a musician, Colm decides to end a friendship he has come to consider an unneccesary distraction. But on a small island, you can't easily avoid other people. 

Colm's solution is to tell Pádraic that he doesn't like him anymore, that he always found him dull, and that he wants no further intercourse. In plain terms, he won't speak to or acknowledge him. Pádraic, who slowly comes to appreciate that he may be the dimmest bulb on the island - the local soft lad, Dominic Kearney (Barry Keoghan) confuses him by using French words - can neither comprehend nor accept this rejection. His sister, Siobahán (Kerry Condon), urges him to move on, but he cannot. The setting for a Greek tragedy in the style of J M Synge is complete. Colm is solipisitic enough to believe that he can publicly admit this devastating truth and imagine that everything else will remain the same, but what he doesn't appreciate is that this act ripples outwards as it erodes the social glue of politeness and rubbing along, prompting first Siobahán to admit the truth (that her brother is dull if nice, that all the men are "feckin' boring") and then leave for the mainland, and then Dominic to commit suicide as he can see no future beyond the violent beatings of his policeman father and his own emotional and sexual frustration. 

There are anachronisms aplenty and many parodies of Irish culture, particularly as seen through the eyes of nineteenth century English writers: the animals in the cabin, the brother and sister in their 40s sharing a bedroom, the brutal policeman - more RIC than Garda - who doesn't have to fear popular justice or the IRA. One oddity is the idea that a small island would have a permanent police presence but that the priest would only visit on Sundays. The reality would have been the other way around. What I think McDonagh is doing here is emphasising that toxic men, represented by the policeman, Peadar Kearney (Gary Lydon), are the problem. Not only is he a domestic abuser, routinely beating his son Dominic, but he displays a callous indifference to others, whether they be condemned IRA men or Pádraic and his sister. The repressive social conservatism of the Catholic Church, though promoted by men, was associated in Ireland with the feminine: Mariolatry, the Magdalene laundries etc. It is consequently held mostly off-stage in McDonagh's script or played for laughs in the postmistress's snooping. 

When Peadar assaults him, Pádraic doesn't fight back, in effect adopting the feminine role, much as Dominic routinely does. Colm, witnessing the scene, wordlessly helps Pádraic to his feet and helps drive the horse and trap back to the Súilleabhaín home. The silence is as much about their shared shame as the newly-established rules of their small society. Colm will later punch Peadar, but this is literally knockabout comedy rather than intrinsic to the plot. Likewise, the scene in which Pádraic and Dominic filch a bottle of poteen from the Kearney house while the father sits drunkenly comatose and nude is an opportunity for the son to comment on Peader's "small brown cock", which is less a critique of toxic masculinity than an example of how it is internalised by boys as a style of rebellion against authority. The one character that rejects these male rules and assertively stands up for herself is Siobahán. She is a symbol of modernity, with her modern clothes and collection of books, though her manner and spiky language are anachronistic. 


Siobahán is balanced by the ominous Mrs McCormick, who is clearly the Shan Van Vocht (the poor old woman personifying Ireland) that inspired Yeat's Cathleen Ni Houlihan and Joyce's parody of the milk-woman in the opening scene of Ulysses. Pádraic's habit of hiding from her on the open road, and Siobahán's indulgence of the old crone's house-calls, exhibit the ambiguity of the younger generation's relationship with Ireland in the early twentieth century, but they also emphasise how pointless their self-delusions are as the old woman repeatedly catches them out and makes her contempt for their insincerity clear. Mrs McCormick is perhaps the most clear-sighted, as well as clairvoyant, character in that she has no illusions about the hatred under the surface and positively revels in saying the unsayable. As such she is a destabilising figure closer to a modern Irish iconclast like John Lydon or Sinead O'Connor than the saintly Cathleen Ni Houlihan.

But this toying with Irish literary culture shouldn't distract from a central narrative device that comes from the traditions of the big screen. Whereas the relationship of Gleeson and Farrell in McDonagh's earlier In Bruges was the classic odd couple familiar from buddy movies - of the older, wiser head and the impetuous youth - in The Banshees of Inisherin it is more obviously the comedy double act that provides the inspiration. The template might appear to be that of Laurel and Hardy: the fat fella with the delusions of grandeur and the thin fella as dim and innocent as the day is long (the pair famously inspired Samuel Beckett and in turn Harold Pinter, whose influence in McDonagh's plays is clear). But I think another, more recent inspiration might be Harry Enfield and Kathy Burke's creations, Kevin and Perry. The defining characteristic of Colm is not his overweening ambition (he is clearly a talented fiddle-player and composer) but his stroppy, teenager-like reaction to not getting his way. And the defining trait of all great comedy double-acts is frustration.

Frustration is the leitmotif that colours all of the main characters. Pádraic is frustrated by Colm's rejection and his own inability to mend the breach. Colm is frustrated in his attempts to devote himself to his music. Dominic is frustrated in his attempts to establish any sort of a meaningful relationship with a woman. Siobahán's seething anger is a study in frustration and petty indignities, from Pádraic's animals invading her home to the postmistress steaming open her letters. Where she differs from the men is that her attempts to have a richer, more meaningful life will ultimately be realised by leaving the island. Colm's parallel attempt to mature is thwarted by his inability to follow the logic of his own analysis, both in the realisation that he is being held back by his community and his cynical appreciation of the Church's role in maintaining it. His "despair" articulates this frustration, while his self-harm shows how it curdles into mindless violence: a obvious metaphor of the Civil War but more profoundly a comment on his own cowardice. He cannot take the route followed by Siobahán. He is trapped in a damaging relationship, but it is with Inisherin, not with Pádraic.

The two main characters are emotionally still children, hence Pádraic's innocent sleeping arrangements and his love of his donkey, Jenny, and Colm's self-indulgence and emotional blackmail. When Pádraic reports Colm's decision to Dominic the younger man tartly responds, "What is he, twelve?" And that's the truth of it. Colm is barely adolescent and Pádraic is a man whose moral and emotional development - his desire to be "nice" - appears to have stopped at the age of eight. This might be a case of McDonagh pointing up the immaturity of the Free State, but I'm inclined to believe that the larger canvas he is working on is that of masculinity and in particular the more extreme, self-pitying anti-feminism exhibited by the likes of Jordan Peterson and the Men Going Their Own Way movement. Colm's self-harm shows the absurdity of separatism; Pádraic shows himself to be easily-led by Dominic's foolish advice and willing to escalate from resentment to arson; while Dominic's death condemns both his father's violence and his own inability to mature and break away. That we can feel sympathy for all three characters is a testament both to the acting and the writing. A fine, sly film about men behaving badly.

Friday, 21 October 2022

We Own This Town

The changing political weather means that every Prime Minister can expect good days and bad days in the press, but the extreme oscillations seen in recent years, and the short to almost vanishing periods between the peaks and troughs, is unusual. Since 2016, every head of government has been undermined by one section or another of the media from their first appearance in front of the lectern outside Number 10. In the case of Theresa May, this focused initially on the debate over what Brexit meant and then the deal she negotiated with the EU, but that emphasis on policy shouldn't mislead us. While the liberal press chafed at what it saw as a historic mistake, the conservative press were only willing to give her unqualified support when she veered to the right and supported their prejudices, e.g. in the attack on the higher judiciary as "enemies of the people". Their attitude to the Brexit negotiations can best be described as querulous. Boris Johnson enjoyed a short interlude during the height of the Covid-19 pandemic, when his optimism briefly chimed with the resoluteness of public opinion, but this simply highlighted the attacks on his consititutional impropriety beforehand and his personal corruption thereafter. 


While these attacks were mostly made by the liberal press, it's worth remembering that the Daily Mail and Daily Telegraph's contribution to "Partygate" wasn't to undermine or dismiss the charges but to claim that Keir Starmer was guilty of similar breaches. Beyond the internecine warfare of the political cartel, what we saw was a media united in the belief that it could stampede politicians into policy changes or even resignation by leveraging their eating a piece of cake or drinking a bottle of beer. It is this corporate belief in their power and authority that we should be attuned to, and not be distracted by their partisanship. Liz Truss obviously made a disastrous start and compounded that at every turn up to her resignation this week, but much of her folly sprang from her misreading of the media, particularly the Tory press. She appeared to take their sometimes lavish praise of her during the summer leadership election contest seriously, failing to understand that she was only ever promoted to stop Sunak. The latter was stymied because he brought down Johnson, and Johnson, in the eyes of the Tory press, was one of their own.

This consistent undermining over the last half-decade isn't the norm in British political history. All governments suffer periods of public criticism, and no Prime Minister is ever free from gravely-expressed doubts about their abilities, but the relentless campaign of destabilisation is novel. Thatcher, Major, Blair and Brown could all claim to have been undermined by the press, like Heath, Wilson and Callaghan before them, but the negative coverage reflected substantive political differences and often came after extended periods of acclaim. Enoch Powell, a man who could ruefully reflect on his own progress from senior office to the margins, once claimed that all political careers end in failure. But that trajectory no longer holds unless you imagine that securing the highest office itself is the proximate moment of failure. Truss and Kwarteng's mini-budget was a massive error, but its consequentiality was as much a result of negative media as bad macroeconomics or the skittishness of the financial markets. There was no honeymoon period but it seems unlikely that any future Prime Minister will enjoy much of one either.

The pivotal figure in this development was David Cameron, not because his decision to hold the EU referendum introduced so much toxic bile into political discourse but because he quit office immediately on the day that the press decisively turned against him. This emboldened them to think they could directly control who would occupy Number 10. For the rightwing press in particular, this was a sweet moment of revenge because of Cameron's indolent sponsorhip of the Leveson Inquiry, which had washed a lot of dirty linen in public and would, if it had proceeded to phase 2, have explored the relationship of the press and politicians directly. That Cameron was only bounced into launching the phase 1 inquiry by the liberal press, following the phone-hacking scandal, was another irritation for the right. While the financial crash of 2008 and the following austerity of the coalition years cast a shadow over the economy and society, the biggest political event was actually the expenses scandal of 2009, which reinforced the press in its belief that it had the whip-hand over politicians. 


For liberal commentators like Rafael Behr, the sequence of weak office-holders since Cameron quit Number 10 for his writing shed is explained by an apparently congenital, even biblical, lack of virtue, thus "Johnson begat Truss. Before that, Theresa May begat Johnson." Behr does acknowledge the influence of the press, but only as a supportive environment rather than as the chief begetter of this uninspiring lineage: "Her plans grew from seeds of US Republican-style anti-government conservatism that isn’t native to Britain’s political soil, in a micro-climate controlled by the Tory press." Anti-government conservatism is obviously neither alien nor historically recent: it is one of the dominant strands of British political history and much of the American tradition can be traced to theorists on this side of the Atlantic. Naturally, Behr will not be commenting on the liberal media's role in promoting Johnson as a flawed but still more suitable incumbent of Number 10 in 2019 than the then leader of the opposition. He will however take pleasure in the role he personally played in that outcome while decrying the role of the Tory press in influencing politics.

This belief in the press's kingmaker powers has contributed to a counter-movement, by both liberal and conservative opinion, away from party democracy. Party members are now routinely denigrated as unrepresentative fools, despite being sociologically closer to the general population than MPs and often motivated by public-spiritedness and engagement with political theory. The implication is that they have been misled by the press as much as by mythical entryists, evil antisemites, or Nigel Farage. Once more we are told that the election of a party leader, and potentially a Prime Minister, should be reserved to MPs. The people telling us this are often the same ones applauding the appointment of Jeremy Hunt to Number 11 as "a safe pair of hands". That's the same Jeremy Hunt who received 18 votes from his fellow MPs in the first round of this summer's Conservative Party leadership election. It's important to understand that this counter-movement is not about bending to the will of the press but resisting it, and the consequences of that can be seen in both of the leading parties.

The purging of the left in Labour might appear to be just the latest round of factional bullying familiar since the party's inception, but its often comically intemperate nature (disqualifying people for liking the social media posts of a Green MP, for example) suggests that there is something else at work here, and that something is about protecting the PLP not only from CLP members with a mind of their own but from the media. The tight message-management and Westminster discipline over relatively trivial matters (e.g. appearing in solidarity on a picket line) aren't just about the leadership's paranoid determination to appeal to rightwing voters but a desire to not provide any opportunity for the press to divide the party or build up challengers to the leadership beyond anointed loyalists. Should Labour form the next government, it will differ from the New Labour years in one important respect. It will not attempt to bully the press, as Alastair Campbell notoriously did, but nor will it seek to cultivate a chummy relationship with it. Rather Starmer will seek to draw a tight boundary around the PLP to minimise the party's attack surface. You can expect accusastions of a "bunker mentality" if Labour take office.


The symbolic end of the Truss administration came with the failure of lobby discipline on Wednesday night (the pearl-clutching reports by Labour MPs like Chris Bryant were also telling). The accelerated leadership election, and the humming and hawing over what role (if any) the Conservative Party membership will have in it, clearly reflects a rueful regret over the course of the summer contest, with its embarrassing media-controlled hustings and the uncritical way in which Truss was promoted by  rightwing newspapers to the party membership. This is an attempt to restore what we might generously refer to as parliamentary democracy, but which more cynically is best described as the cartel. What we're witnessing is a power struggle within the politico-media caste that has been going on since the phone-hacking scandal came to prominence in 2005. Much of what happened since, from the response to the financial crash through to Brexit, has been coloured by this struggle, and there is every reason to believe that it will continue for some years yet. Starmer's defensive strategy does not suggest that press reform is coming any time soon.