tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5312853715123370916.post7803401207487978072..comments2024-03-17T00:10:44.022+00:00Comments on From Arse To Elbow: That Would Be a Constitutional MatterDavid Timoneyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03568348438980023320noreply@blogger.comBlogger5125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5312853715123370916.post-45201843343741404022019-09-28T17:48:09.920+01:002019-09-28T17:48:09.920+01:00very sagacious very sagacious Keithhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00769952853595228563noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5312853715123370916.post-79306501647257694022019-09-21T15:29:10.691+01:002019-09-21T15:29:10.691+01:00I think Thompson is correct (I presume this is the...I think Thompson is correct (I presume this is the link: https://www.lrb.co.uk/blog/2019/september/talking-politics). <br /><br />My argument is that the SC faces a dilemma. If it finds that proprogation is not justiciable, then it is inviting the Commons to a) make it so and b) assert that the SC should as a matter of principle recognise that any action by the executive to constrain the Commons is unconstitutional.David Timoneyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03568348438980023320noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5312853715123370916.post-58410565333073505242019-09-21T12:41:03.064+01:002019-09-21T12:41:03.064+01:00'parliament is right even when it's wrong&...'parliament is right even when it's wrong'. Would the supreme court actually agree with that statement?<br /><br />How would you respond to Helen Thompson's argument that our Constitution is fundamentally political<br /><br />I can't paste the link, but her argument is summarised on the LRB blog for 29 sept, under Talking PoliticsHugo Evanshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12705056750207255618noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5312853715123370916.post-69602343453174324322019-09-20T20:53:09.313+01:002019-09-20T20:53:09.313+01:00The principle of sovereignty means that parliament...The principle of sovereignty means that parliament is right even when it's wrong.<br /><br />More pragmatically, the government engineered a situation where the Commons was faced with a choice: pass a bill to mandate an extension or move a vote of no confidence. There wasn't time to do both and the consensus, which may certainly have been informed by partisan calculation on the part of some, was that an extension had to take priority in the short-term. In those circumstances, I don't think the Supreme Court could infer that the Commons did not wish to exercise power over prorogation.David Timoneyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03568348438980023320noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5312853715123370916.post-47447314905980988102019-09-20T18:09:36.335+01:002019-09-20T18:09:36.335+01:00You argue that since all legitimacy derives from t...You argue that since all legitimacy derives from the commons including ultimately prorogation power, the supreme court could well we'll take the view it should find this issue iusticable, since prorogation in this case clearly does not command parliament's approval. <br /><br />But is it really so simply. Parliament did have an option, faced with a government acting against its wishes. It could have held a vote of no confidence. The supreme court cannot help but notice that parliament didn't do this, for political reasons - namely to avoid either an election or the prospect of Corbyn as PM of a coalition. By not doing this parliament has placed the supreme court in a political position. Does it's democratic legitimacy extend to being able to do this too? Given it has waived the use of its conventional power, why should the supreme court agree that the commons should be able to extend its power over itself the supreme court ???Hugo Evanshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12705056750207255618noreply@blogger.com